

The Impact of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) on State Enterprises and Parastatals (SEPs) Performance in Zimbabwe: The Case of Zimbabwe National Road Administration (ZINARA)

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Abstract:

The study focused on the impact of PPPs on SEPs’ performance in Zimbabwe. The research objectives were focused on factors that caused ZINARA to adopt PPPs, challenges faced in implementing PPP at ZINARA and the extent to which the resources support through PPP affect ZINARA’s performance in road services delivery. The study made use of qualitative and quantitative data. The study made use of questionnaires and interviews to collect data. The study concludes that factors that influenced ZINARA to adopt PPPs were: the need for financial resources, infrastructure development, to improve efficiency, to reduce poverty and to fuel economic growth. ZINARA was faced by challenges in implementing PPPs with the Group Five and these were: contract renegotiation, performance enforcement, political acceptability, lack of sound regulatory framework, lack of fulfilment of key formation requirements, lack of common vision and win-win relationship, multiple interests of key participants and conflict between public and private sector officials in PPPs. PPPs have improved ZINARA’s performance in road services delivery through safe travel to road users, improved quality of roads, more facilities in the roads, improved efficiency in road services, clean and attractive roads, improved revenue collection and improved cost management strategies. The study offers six policy recommendations in order to improve the performance of SEPs in Zimbabwe.

Keywords —PPP, Roads, SEPs, Transport, ZINARA

I. INTRODUCTION

State-owned Enterprises and Parastatals (SEPs) play an important role in the Zimbabwean economy, but their poor financial and operational performance has limited their impact. SEPs are essential players in promoting socio-economic development by providing public and social infrastructure services essential to humanity such as food, water, electricity and health to mention just a few (Muzapu *et al*, 2016). In Zimbabwe, SEPs

drive investment and job creation in key sectors, provide vital public services, and implement public policies (World Bank, 2017). This research seeks to investigate the impact of PPPs on SEPs performance in Zimbabwe, with ZINARA as a case study.

Background

Zimbabwe is a land-locked country with a population of about 13 million (according to 2012

census), making national and regional road transport connectivity a necessary condition for promoting socio-economic activity through movement of the country's imports and exports as well as transit freight. The country has been the bread basket of Southern Africa in the 1990's and a strong member in the Food Security Council of SADC and the road infrastructure has immensely contributed to this esteemed status. But, after decades of economic contraction, Zimbabwe faces more challenges to its economy from external shocks and an unfavourable policy environment. Despite the turbulence of recent years, Zimbabwe's economic fundamentals remain strong especially its highly educated human capital and a wealth of natural resources.

Some policy reforms by the government affected progress come on the back of a political and economic crisis (2000 to 2008) that nearly halved Zimbabwe's GDP which is the sharpest contraction of its kind in a peacetime economy. Poverty rose to more than 72%, plunging a fifth of the population into extreme poverty. Health, education, and other basic services once regional models largely collapsed in 2001, the UN's Human Development Index (HDI) placed Zimbabwe right down the list at 173th out of 187 countries.

After experiencing record hyperinflation in 2008, the country adopted a multicurrency regime in 2009 (dollarization) that ushered in macroeconomic stability and positive economic growth. Inflation stabilized; revenue and bank deposits recovered sharply. The country began to make token payments on its arrears and embarked on a series of Staff Monitored Programs with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).


African Development Bank (AfDB) (2011) recognizes that infrastructure development in Zimbabwe faces numerous challenges and constraints which inter alia include; (i) lack of maintenance due to financial constraints; (ii) accelerated deterioration through misuse; (iii) capacity constraints due to migration of skilled personnel; (iii) inadequate funding for infrastructure green-field projects; (iv) high rates of accidents;

and (v) lack of an integrated approach in infrastructure investment planning. To address some of the challenges, GoZ has prepared a Mid-Term Plan (MTP, 2011-2015) and the Zimbabwe Agenda for Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim Asset, 2013-2018) with proposals that include among others; (i) rehabilitation and maintenance of the infrastructure; (i) mobilizing resources through user pay principles; and (ii) use of PPP ventures to finance and operate infrastructure and services. The completion of the transport master plan will contribute to solving some of the challenges referred to above.

Due to the economic downturn in Zimbabwe the existing roads condition deteriorated, and this was worsened by the GoZ's inability to allocate a significant portion of the national budget towards capital projects due to absence of fiscal space. Thus the GoZ took a stance to adopt PPPs, under which the private sector would be called in to partner government, mostly through funding, for the development of infrastructure as well as ensuring the necessary technological transfer.

The general condition of the roads in Zimbabwe has deteriorated due to inadequate funding for regular maintenance although, the country road density in Zimbabwe is about 0.23 km per square km as Figure 1 below indicates. This is high compared with many developing countries; it is comparable to that of the high income, non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and lower middle-income countries. Only OECD countries have a substantially higher road density than Zimbabwe. The implication is that a relatively high proportion of the population has access to the road network of the country. Moreover, Zimbabwe has a very substantial road network relative to its gross domestic product (GDP) but what is paramount is rehabilitation of existing roads network which have dispensation where economic recovery is at the centre of the country activities.

Figure 1 Comparison of Road Densities (km per sq. km)



Source: International Road Federation (2009)

The transport sector in Zimbabwe comprises of five modes, namely, road, rail, aviation, inland water and pipeline transport. The road network excluding urban roads totals 76,241km of which 9,256km or 12.1% are bitumen surfaced. ZINARA is a Zimbabwean parastatal responsible for the management, maintenance and development of Zimbabwe's national road network. ZINARA falls under the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development and was established in August 2001, in terms of the Roads Act of 2001 with the aim of enhancing road network system throughout the Zimbabwe (ZINARA, 2018). The operations of ZINARA are controlled and managed by a Board comprising twelve members appointed by the Minister responsible for roads. The functions of ZINARA are defined by the Road Act. They include:

- i. Fix road user charges and collect such charges, fuel levies and other revenue for the Road Fund.
- ii. Allocate and disburse funds from the Road Fund to the road authorities.
- iii. Monitor the use of funds by the road authorities including the implementation of road maintenance works.

- iv. Assist road authorities to prepare road maintenance plans and approve such plans.
- v. Assist the Minister to set out technical standards for roads and ensure that the road authorities adhere to these.

1.2 Relevance of the Study

Zimbabwe has fallen into a state of almost complete economic and social collapse characterised by SEPs poorly performing and delivering inefficient public services especially in areas of road services, primary healthcare, the provision of clean water and electricity due to a long series of economic downturn facing the country (Dube & Chigumira, 2011; Mid Term Fiscal Policy, 2015; Zimbabwe National Budget, 2018). The Government of Zimbabwe has taken a distinctive policy position to adopt PPPs under which the private sector partner government to address this scourge of continuous deterioration in existing public infrastructure facing SEPs. Therefore, this research is aimed at evaluating the impact of PPPs on ZINARA performance where the policy was adopted and is being implemented.

Research Objectives

- i. To determine how PPPs have impacted on ZINARA performance.
- ii. To identify factors that caused ZINARA to adopt PPP policy.
- iii. To investigate challenges faced in implementing PPP at ZINARA.
- iv. To assess the extent to which the resources support through PPP affect ZINARA's performance in road services delivery.
- v. To suggest possible best practice of improving efficiency using PPPs.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Definition of PPPs

There are quite a number of definitions of PPPs available in literature, the following are the most popular ones:

- i. PPP refers to an arrangement where the private sector supplies assets and services that traditionally have been provided by the government. In addition to private execution and financing of public investment, PPPs have two other important characteristics: there is an emphasis on service provision, as well as investment, by the private sector; and significant risk is transferred from the government to the private sector (IMF, 2004).
- ii. PPPs are an agreement between the government and one or more private partners which may include operators and financiers according to which the private partners deliver a service so the service delivery objectives of the government are aligned with the profit objective of the private partners and the effectiveness of the alignment depends on a sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners (OECD, 2008).
- iii. PPP is an agreement between the government and a private partner with both parties sharing a common vision, shared goals, investment from all partners and a formalized structure with shared decision making coordination, funding, product development, and delivery (McKinsey, 2009).
- iv. PPPs are long-term contracts between a private party and a government agency, for providing a public asset or service, in which

the private party bears significant risk and management responsibility (World Bank, 2012).

This research will adopt the IMF (2004) definition due to its relevance and applicability in the context of Zimbabwe. This is owing to the fact that in the Zimbabwean context the provision of public service (roads) was traditionally the mandate of the government, but due to dynamic factors at play the government through ZINARA have partnered with Group Five a private player to be involved in the provision of national roads thereby taking momentous risk from the government.

PPP Models

The main forms of PPPs include the following:

Build and Transfer (BT)

A contractual arrangement whereby counter-party undertakes the financing and construction of a given project and after its completion hands it over to the Government or a contracting authority. The Government or the contracting authority reimburses the total project investment, on the basis of an agreed schedule. This arrangement may be employed in the construction of any project, including critical facilities, which for security or strategic reasons must be operated directly by the contracting authority.

Build, Lease and Transfer (BLI)

A contractual arrangement whereby a counterparty undertakes to finance and construct any project and upon its completion hands it over to the Government or a contracting authority concerned on a lease arrangement for a fixed period, after which ownership of the project is automatically transferred to the Government or the contracting authority concerned.

Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT)

Is a contractual arrangement whereby a counter-party undertakes the construction, including financing of a given infrastructure facility and the

operation and maintenance of it. The counterparty operates the facility over a fixed term during which the counterparty is allowed to collect user levies, fees, rentals and other charges not exceeding those proposed in the bid or as negotiated and incorporated in the agreement or regulations to enable the recovery of the investment in the project. The counterparty transfers the project to the Government or the contracting authority concerned at the end of the fixed term that shall be specified in the agreement. This includes a supply and operate situation which is a contractual arrangement whereby the supplier of equipment and machinery for a given project, if the interest of the Government or the contracting authority so requires, operates the facility, providing in the process technology transfer and training to Government, a regulatory agency, the contracting authority or nominated individuals.

Build, Own and Operate (BOO)

A contractual arrangement whereby a counterparty is authorised to finance, construct, own, operate and maintain a project from which the counterparty is allowed to recover its total investment by collecting user levies. Under the project, the counterparty owns the assets of the project and may choose to assign its operation and maintenance to a project operator. The transfer of the project to the Government or the contracting authority is not envisaged in this structure. However, the Government or contracting authority may terminate its obligations after a specified time period.

Build, Own, Operate and Transfer (BOOT)

A contractual arrangement whereby a counterparty is authorised to finance, construct, maintain and operate a project and whereby the project is to vest in the counterparty for a specific period. During the operation period the counterparty will be permitted to charge user levies specified in the agreement, in order to recover the investment made in the project. The counterparty is liable to transfer the project to the Government or the contracting authority after the expiry of the specified period of operation.

Build, Transfer and Operate (BTO)

A contractual arrangement whereby the Government or a contracting authority contracts out a project to a counterparty to construct the facility on a turnkey basis, assuming costs overruns, delays and other specified performance risks. Once the facility is commissioned satisfactorily, the counterparty is given the right to operate the project and collect user levies under an agreement. The title of the project always vests with the Government or the contracting authority in this arrangement.

Develop, Operate and Transfer (DOT)

A contractual arrangement whereby favourable conditions external to a new project which is to be built by a counterparty are integrated into the BOT arrangement by giving the counterparty the right to develop adjoining property and thus enjoy some of the benefits the investment creates such as higher property or rent values.

Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer (ROT)

A contractual arrangement whereby any existing facility is handed over to a counterparty to refurbish, operate and collect user levies in the operation period to recover the investment and maintain for a franchise period, at the expiry of which the facility is turned over to the Government or a contracting authority. The term is also used to describe the purchase of an existing facility from abroad, and importing, refurbishing, erecting and consuming it within the host country.

Rehabilitate, Own and Operate (ROO)

A contractual arrangement whereby an existing facility is handed over to the counterparty to refurbish and operate with no time limitation imposed on ownership. As long as the counterparty is not in violation of its franchise, it can continue to operate the facility and collect user levies in perpetuity.

Critical Success factors of PPPs

Paramount for PPPs thriving within economies is government involvement, a sound regulatory framework and a common vision between government agency involved and private player. Table 1 below presents an overview of critical success factors of PPPs:

Table 1: Critical Success Factors of PPPs

- ii. **Step two is deciding the optimal mode of entry?** Once they have decided to enter a country, investors must next determine their mode of entry. The mode of entry is based on the sector, the level of risk, and the potential to generate revenue. This is the stage where the investor will decide on its level of commitment to the market, which determines the type and value of the PPP contract.
- iii. **Step three is the level of resource commitment and knowledge transfer?** After entry, investors decide how much of their technical expertise to share and technology to invest in, what prices to charge, how many new products to introduce, and other provision related decisions. For public sector policy makers looking to invigorate the economy, this step is the most important, as the level of commitment and knowledge transfer is the factor that most affects the PPP's influence on the economy.

World Bank (2014) posits that with this three-step decision making process, the government's role is apparent. To encourage private investors to enter into PPPs, governments need to minimize economic and political risks. And although sound policies will help attract PPPs to the market, astute negotiating is necessary to develop agreements that will improve the overall economy.

Governments need to minimize economic and political risks. Investing in an infrastructure project at any level is risky for the private investor. The government cannot control fluctuations in the world markets, but it can minimize political and economic risks within its purview to attract more PPPs to its market. Governments with well-established and enforced policies against corruption, combined with low business transaction costs, a transparent legislative system, and exchange rate and monetary stability are far more attractive to the private sector,

particularly for projects that require a sizable investment of capital and knowledge. Governments with homogenous populations and fewer veto points should capitalize on this advantage, as reforms are easier to introduce and manage.

Policies that ensure overall economic stability will minimize financial risk for the private investor. For example, a country with an independent central bank that is free from political influence is understandably more appealing to a private investor than a country with little monetary stability. Accounting for the PPP in the budget process will also yield more stable results, as decisions are based on affordability and the project's rate of return.

Furthermore, defined standards for dealing with PPP partners, an established champion for the PPP process, and clear rules for entering into and maintaining PPP agreements send a distinct message that the government is organized and committed to bringing private sector investments into the nation. Policymakers then need to market the idea to the public to garner support.

World Bank (2012) highlighted that countries and markets need to be sufficiently mature to apply the concept of PPPs wisely. She further points out that success in PPPs is contingent on certain arrangements: (i) clear and stable market rules; (ii) sound and predictable legal and regulatory environments; and (iii) well-designed projects, including appropriate risk allocation. This implies that government authorities need to be sophisticated enough to develop sector reform policies, assess fiscal risks associated with PPPs, base their decision of public procurement versus PPP on comprehensive value for money assessments, and have impartial transaction advisory at hand to make PPP deals bankable and sustainable.

For PPPs to be successful governments can decide on organizing a dedicated "PPP unit" at the country level which is aimed at identifying a sustainable "PPP champion," and facilitate inter-ministerial coordination of PPPs in the country like what was done in Zimbabwe in 2016 through the Act of parliament of having Joint Ventures ACT (Chapter 22:22). This act states that the Zimbabwean

Government has established for the purpose of this Act as a unit to be known as the Joint Venture Unit, which shall be a department of the Ministry of Finance.

OECD (2008) affirms that dedicated PPP units may serve well as the engine of PPP development; however, their existence and proactive engagement may easily imply implicit approval of PPPs as opposed to other procurement options.

III. METHODOLOGY

Research Design

Employing questionnaires and face-to-face interviews, the study obtained detailed information from staff at the ZINARA headquarters and motorists, respectively. The study used a pragmatism philosophical assumption or worldview point. This philosophy involves use of inductive methods combined with deductive approaches. The adoption of a mixed research method (triangulation) took advantage of the advantages of the two methods; qualitative and quantitative research methods. This is because open questions to test certain propositions were inductive, whilst closed questions for the collection of quantitative data were deductive. This multi method approach according to Bryman & Bell (2003) allows the researcher to collect data related to experiences of the individuals who witnessed the implementation of PPP at ZINARA and its implications.

In this research qualitative method was adopted because, as stated by Bryman & Bell (2003); it allows for a better comprehension of studies with complexities such as the assessment of a PPP policy. It also permitted a more thorough insight into issues, which had just emerged, and the complexities of particular implications the policy had to performance of ZINARA in service delivery. The positive or negative impacts of the PPP policy and its implications are too complex to merely use quantitative research. This is because quantitative research is about enumeration and records which are important to the study but they cannot form the base because there was need to study the

characteristics and explanations of phenomena that were encountered within the PPP implementation, therefore the adoption of both techniques was found prudent. Quantitative research seeks explanations and on the other side of the same coin, qualitative research seeks to explore the explanations hence it presented multiple realities that are broad and flexible rather than a narrow single reality from quantitative. In fact, two primary research tools were utilised in this study. In the first instance, questionnaires allowed ZINARA management and employees to voice their thoughts and opinions on the PPP policy that was adopted and implemented at ZINARA. The study also conducted face to face interviews with motorists as follow up on the service delivery performance changes they have experienced after the implementation of PPP policy at ZINARA.

Research Population

The research population in this study comprised of ZINARA management and employees at the headquarters which was 224 that is management personnel and non-management personnel which was 42 and 182 at the time of the study respectively. The researchers realised that it was important to also include motorists as respondents mainly because they are the direct beneficiaries of the ZINARA PPP. The management and employees at ZINARA headquarters have vital understanding of the impacts of PPP on organisation performance because that is where strategic decisions are made.

Sample Design

The sample size for this research is 63 % of ZINARA management and employees at headquarters. Qualitative information was gathered in detail through conducting interviews with 25 motorists who were randomly selected and interviewed using convenience sampling at 15 km peg Harare-Mutare highway rest point, near Mabvuku-turnoff. This was done considering the homogeneity in motorists' interests and perspective and they are exceptionally many hence the study could have become costly and time consuming. The

study therefore, used simple random sampling for management and employees at ZINARA headquarters and judgemental sampling for motorists. Non-probability (judgemental) sampling does not use statistics in selecting samples but uses personal inferences and judgments of the researcher.

Ethical Considerations

Confidentiality of staff taking part in questionnaires was safeguarded. All information provided to the researchers was treated with both anonymity and confidentiality so that staff was able to answer freely, truthfully and without any fear of any repercussions. There were no physical measures involved in this research and nothing involving vulnerable persons.

The study was always guided by Silverman (2000) who states that “researchers should always remember that while they are doing their research, they are in actual fact entering the private spaces of their participants”. Understandably, this raises several ethical issues that should be addressed during, and after the research had been conducted. Creswell (2003) highlighted that when conducting a study researchers have an obligation to respect the rights, needs, values and desires of the informants. Miles and Huberman (1994) list several issues that researchers should consider when analysing data among them informed consent, harm and risk, honesty and trust, privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity and intervention and advocacy. This noble guideline cautioned the researchers to be vigilant before, during, and after the research was conducted.

IV. FINDINGS

Response Rate

Table 2 presents the response rate.

Table 2: Response Rate from Questionnaires Responses

Population			Response		Non Response	
	N	n	f	%	f	%
ZINARA	42	42	28	67%	14	33%

Management Personnel						
ZINARA Non Managerial Personnel	782	182	114	78%	68	22%
Total	829	224	142	63%	82	37%

Table 2 shows that from the 224 questionnaires distributed to ZINARA employees 142 were returned. This represents 63% response rate. Management respondents achieved a 67% response rate whilst non managerial personnel achieved a 78% response rate. The response rate was seen as good enough to reach generalised responses as the researcher managed to gather detailed data. For samples of 200 to 350, authors such as Silverman (2000) and Creswell (2003) argue that a response rate above 60% is satisfactory and acceptable for a research to carried out.

Demographics and General Information of Respondents from ZINARA

This section presents the gender, highest education qualification, years working at ZINARA and respondents’ level at ZINARA.

Gender of Respondents

Figure 2 presents gender of respondents.

Figure 2: Gender of Respondents




Figure 2 shows that male respondents were 53.5% compared to females 46.5%. This implies that there were more males compared to females at ZINARA. However, there was a marginal difference as reflected by low mean and low standard error of the mean. Despite marginal gender proportional

differences all the categories of respondents showed a good understanding of the topic. This implies that gender differences did not influence the study's outcome but it showed that there was no gender bias in the collection of data.

Education Level

Figure 3 presents highest educational qualifications of respondents.

Figure 3: Highest Education Qualifications of Respondents




Figure 3 shows that 42.3% of respondents had undergraduate degree qualifications, 31.7% had diploma qualifications, 19.7% of respondents had post graduate qualifications and 6.3% of respondents had secondary qualifications. This implies that most respondents were degreed. Further, it shows that most of the respondents had the capacity to the topic under study. From the 142 respondents, 133 had tertiary qualifications with only 9 people having secondary qualifications. Despite disparities on the level of education, all the categories of respondents had a detailed understanding of the topic.

Years Working at ZINARA

Table 3 presents respondents' working experience at ZINARA.

Table 3: Respondents' Working Experience at ZINARA

		Frequency	Percent	V
Valid	Less than 2 years	47	33.1	3
	Between 2 and 5 years	59	41.5	4
	More than 5 years	36	25.4	2
	Total	142	100.0	1

Table 3 shows that 41.5% of respondents had 2to 5 years working experience at ZINARA. Those with less than two years working experience at ZINARA were 33.1% and those with more than 5 years working experience at ZINARA were 25.4%. This implies that most respondents had 2 to 5 years working experience. This shows that most of the respondents had adequate knowledge about ZINARA's PPPs. However, despite differences in experience at ZINARA all the categories of respondents showed a good understanding of the topic.

Factors that Influenced ZINARA to Adopt PPPs

This section presents the factors that influenced ZINARA to Adopt PPPs.

The Need for Financial Resources

Table 4 presents the findings on whether the need for financial resources influenced ZINARA's adoption of PPPs.

Table 4: The need for financial resources

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	5	3.5
	Disagree	10	7.0
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	4	2.8
	Agree	36	25.4
	Strongly Agree	87	61.3
	Total	142	100.0

Table 4 shows that 61.3% of respondents strongly agreed that the need for financial resources influenced ZINARA to do PPPs and this was supported by 25.4% of respondents who agreed. However, 3.5% of respondents strongly disagreed, 7% of respondents disagreed and 2.8% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. This implies that most respondents strongly agreed that the need for financial resources influenced

ZINARA to do PPPs. This was because Zimbabwe through ZINARA lacked enough resources to carry out development of road infrastructure. These findings are related to Malik (2010) who affirms that the government of Pakistan decided to implement PPPs because they did not have the resources to accomplish the tasks alone. In addition, Whilst Jamali, (2004) highlighted that The Lebanese government considered PPPs as lacked financial resources. therefore, it is vital to conclude that the use of PPP in infrastructure projects like roads has mainly risen because the governments have insufficient financial resources in as in many cases China local officials believe that only funding from the private sector can fill the immense gap between the limited presence of public resources and rapidly growing sustainable urban infrastructure needs. (de Jong *et al.*, 2010).

The Need to Promote Infrastructure Development

Table 5 presents the findings on whether the need for infrastructure development influenced ZINARA to adopt PPPs.

Table 5: The Need to Promote Infrastructure Development

	Frequency
Valid	
Strongly Disagree	10
Disagree	7
Neither Agree nor Disagree	4
Agree	36
Strongly Agree	85
Total	142

Table 5 shows that 59.9% of respondents strongly agreed that the need to promote infrastructure development influenced ZINARA to do PPPs and this was supported by 25.4% of respondents who agreed. However, 7% of respondents strongly disagreed, 4.9% of respondents disagreed and 2.8% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. This implies that most respondents strongly agreed that the need to promote infrastructure development influenced ZINARA to do PPPs. This was mainly because Zimbabwe was an interconnecting country in Southern Africa and has the onus to develop its

roads in world class state in-order to derive both comparative and absolute advantages in the world market. In line with these results, Dewan *et al.* (2006) mention that PPPs help developing countries to develop their infrastructure. Therefore, SEPs need to develop infrastructure using PPPs in line with the respondents' thoughts.

The Need to Improve Efficiency

Table 6 presents the findings on whether the need to improve efficiency influenced ZINARA to adopt PPPs.

Table 6: The Need to Improve Efficiency

	Frequency	Percent
Valid		
Strongly Disagree	4	2.8
Disagree	7	4.9
Neither Agree nor Disagree	5	3.5
Agree	38	26.8
Strongly Agree	88	62.0
Total	142	100.0

Table 6 shows that 62% of respondents strongly agreed that the need to improve efficiency influenced ZINARA to do PPPs and this was supported by 26.8% of respondents who agreed. However, 2.8% of respondents strongly disagreed, 4.9% of respondents disagreed and 2.8% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. This implies that most respondents strongly agreed that the need to improve efficiency influenced ZINARA to do PPPs. This meant that ZINARA engaged a private player Group Five with vast experience in management of roads as to improve its efficiency as witnessed by world class toll-gates which are automated and providing efficient services. On this, Grace & Duce (2011) found out that PPPs improves efficiency in the public sector from a study they conducted in developing countries.

The Need to Improve Political Relations

Table 7 presents the findings on whether the need to improve political relations influenced ZINARA to adopt PPPs

Table 7: The Need to Improve Political Relations

	Frequency	Percent
Valid		
Strongly Disagree	22	15.5

Disagree	48	33.8
Neither Agree nor Disagree	25	17.6
Agree	17	12.0
Strongly Agree	30	21.1
Total	142	100.0

Table 7 shows that 33.8% of respondents disagreed that the need to improve relations influenced ZINARA to do PPPs and this was supported by 15.5% of respondents who strongly disagreed. However, 17.6% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed, 21.1% of respondents strongly agreed and 12% of respondents agreed. This implies that the need to improve political relations was not one of the core reasons of ZINARA in forming PPPs. These findings were contrary to Kuriyan & Ree (2008) who found out that PPPs are being formed because of the international environment that strongly support economic liberalization and less state intervention. Hence, the involvement of Zimbabwe in international and regional bodies was not making it imperative for Zimbabwean SEPs to be bound by the rules and regulations of those bodies.

The Need to Reduce Poverty

Table 8 presents the findings on whether the need to reduce poverty influenced ZINARA to adopt PPPs

Table 8: The Need to Reduce Poverty

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	5	3.5
	Disagree	12	8.5
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	4	2.8
	Agree	36	25.4
	Strongly Agree	85	59.9
Total		142	100.0

Table 8 shows that 59.9% of respondents strongly agreed that the need to reduce poverty influenced ZINARA to do PPPs and this was supported by 25.4% of respondents who agreed. However, 3.5% of respondents strongly disagreed, 8.5% of respondents disagreed and 2.8% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. These results show that reducing poverty was one of the government’s reasons of forming PPPs through its parastatals. PPP interventions are seen as having the capacity to

improve infrastructure, spurring economic growth that eventually reaches the poor. The majority of PPP interventions followed that logic, as they were positioned with the growth pillar of the country assistance strategies (DfID, 2008).

The Need to Fuel Economic Growth

Table 9 presents the findings on whether the need to fuel economic growth influenced ZINARA to adopt PPPs.

Table 9: The need to Fuel Economic Growth

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	4	2.8
	Disagree	7	4.9
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	6	4.2
	Agree	37	26.1
	Strongly Agree	88	62.0
Total		142	100.0

Table 9 shows that 59.9% of respondents strongly agreed that the need to fuel economic growth influenced ZINARA to do PPPs and this was supported by 26.1% of respondents who agreed. However, 2.8% of respondents strongly disagreed, 4.9% of respondents disagreed and 4.2% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. This implies that most respondents strongly agreed that the need to fuel economic growth influenced ZINARA to do PPPs. These findings are related to Shediak *et al.* (2015) who pointed out that there is strong evidence which suggests that the more PPP projects launched in a nation, the higher the rate of GDP growth. Provision of good roads throughout the country is vital since roads facilitate economic activities, and access to local, regional and international markets. Zimbabwe is strategically positioned to provide a gateway to markets within the SADC region and beyond and is endowed with vast minerals and good soils for agriculture therefore, good and reliable roads are critical for exports.

Challenges in the Implementation of PPPs at ZINARA

This section presents findings related to the challenges faced in the implementation of PPPs at ZINARA.

Challenges in Contract Renegotiation

Table 10 establishes whether contract renegotiation was a challenge faced in the implementation of PPPs at ZINARA.

Table 10: Challenges in Contract Renegotiation

		Frequency
Valid	Strongly Disagree	3
	Disagree	12
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	4
	Agree	40
	Strongly Agree	83
	Total	142

Table 10 shows that 58.5% of respondents strongly agreed that challenges faced in implementing PPP at ZINARA included contract renegotiation. This was supported by 28.2% of respondents who agreed whilst 2.1% of respondents strongly disagreed, 8.5% of respondents disagreed and 2.8% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. This implies that most respondents strongly agreed that challenges faced in implementing PPP at ZINARA included contract renegotiation. This implies that some of the aspects of the contracts were difficult to renegotiate at some stage. This challenge intensified due to the case that ZINARA was implementing PPP policy for the first time and among the pioneers in Zimbabwe. Dewan *et al.* (2006), Grace and Duce (2011) found similar findings.

Difficulties in Performance Enforcement

Table 11 establishes whether difficulties in performance enforcement was a challenge faced in the implementation of PPPs at ZINARA

Table 11: Difficulties in Performance Enforcement

		Frequency
Valid	Strongly Disagree	7
	Disagree	12
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	4
	Agree	39
	Strongly Agree	80
	Total	142

Table 11 shows that 56.3% of respondents strongly agreed that challenges faced in implementing PPP at ZINARA included difficulties in performance enforcement. This was supported by 27.5% of respondents who agreed whilst 4.9% of respondents disagreed. Performance was seen as having many dimensions which makes it difficult for PPP parties. Grace and Duce (2011) found similar findings when they revealed that one of the difficulties with performance specification in the area of service delivery is that performance sometimes has dimensions which are hard to formulate in a way that is suitable for an arms-length contract.

Political Acceptability

Table 12 establishes whether political acceptability was a challenge faced in the implementation of PPPs at ZINARA.

Table 12: Political Acceptability

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	5	3.5
	Disagree	7	4.9
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	8	5.6
	Agree	41	28.9
	Strongly Agree	81	57.0
	Total	142	100.0

Table 12 shows that 57.0% of respondents strongly agreed that challenges faced in implementing PPP at ZINARA included political acceptability. This was supported by 28.9% of respondents who agreed whilst 3.5% of respondents strongly disagreed, 4.9% of respondents disagreed and 5.6% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. This implies that political acceptability was a challenge

predestined that given the difficulties in estimating financial outcomes over long periods, there is a risk that the private sector party will either go bankrupt, or make very large profits. Grace & Duce (2011) note that both outcomes can create political problems for the government, causing it to intervene.

Permanent Government Involvement

Table 13 establishes whether permanent government involvement was a challenge faced in the implementation of PPPs at ZINARA.

Table 13: Permanent Government Involvement

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	41	28.9	28.9
	Disagree	37	26.1	55.0
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	5	3.5	58.5
	Agree	25	17.6	76.1
	Strongly Agree	34	23.9	100.0
	Total	142	100.0	

Table 13 shows that 23.9% of respondents strongly agreed that challenges faced in implementing PPP at ZINARA included political acceptability. This was supported by 17.6% of respondents who agreed whilst 28.9% of respondents strongly disagreed, 26.1% of respondents disagreed and 3.5% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. This implies that permanent government involvement was not a challenge in a PPP agreement and implementation. These findings are similar to Jamali (2004) who found out that the public sector should continue to set standards and monitor product safety, efficacy and quality and establish systems whereby citizens have adequate access to the products and services they need.

Lack of sound regulatory framework

Table 14 establishes whether lack of sound regulatory framework was a challenge faced in the implementation of PPPs at ZINARA.

Table 14: Lack of Sound Regulatory Framework

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	3	2.1	2.1
	Disagree	13	9.2	11.3
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	4	2.8	14.1
	Agree	38	26.8	40.9
	Strongly Agree	84	59.2	100.0
	Total	142	100.0	

Table 14 shows that 59.2% of respondents strongly agreed that challenges faced in implementing PPP

at ZINARA included lack of sound regulatory framework. This was supported by 26.8% of respondents who agreed whilst 2.1% of respondents strongly disagreed, 9.2% of respondents disagreed and 2.8% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. These findings imply that lack of sound regulatory framework was a challenge in a PPP agreement and implementation. Related to this, Jamali (2004) found out that regulation provides assurance to the private sector that the regulatory system includes protection from expropriation, arbitration of commercial disputes, respect for contracts, and legitimate recovery of costs and profit proportional to the risks undertaken.

Lack of Fulfilment of Key Formation Requirements

Table 15 establishes whether lack of fulfilment of key formation requirements was a challenge faced in the implementation of PPPs at ZINARA.

Table 15: Lack of Fulfilment of Key Formation Requirements

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	3	2.1
	Disagree	12	8.5
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	5	3.5
	Agree	36	25.4
	Strongly Agree	86	60.6
	Total	142	100.0

Table 15 shows that 60.6% of respondents strongly agreed that challenges faced in implementing PPP at ZINARA included lack of fulfilment of key formation requirements. This was supported by 25.4% of respondents who agreed whilst 2.1% of respondents strongly disagreed, 8.5% of respondents disagreed and 3.5% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. These findings imply that lack of fulfilment of key formation requirements was a challenge in a PPP agreement and implementation. This shows that PPPs had challenges that included alignment cooperation and convergence of working cultures. Related to this, Jamali (2004) refers to Samii *et al.* (2002) when addressing key formation requirements of effective

PPPs and these include intensive communication, alignment of cooperation learning capability, and converging working cultures.

Lack of Common Vision and Win-Win Relationship

Table 16 establishes whether lack of common vision and win-win relationship was a challenge faced in the implementation of PPPs at ZINARA.

Table 16: Lack of Common Vision and Win-Win Relationship

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	2	2.8	2.8	2.8
	Disagree	7	9.9	9.9	12.7
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	4	5.5	5.5	18.2
	Agree	44	59.9	59.9	78.1
	Strongly Agree	85	114.9	114.9	100.0
Total		142			

Table 16 shows that 59.9% of respondents strongly agreed that challenges faced in implementing PPP at ZINARA included lack of common vision and win-win relationship. This was supported by 31.0% of respondents who agreed whilst 1.4% of respondents strongly disagreed, 4.9% of respondents disagreed and 2.8% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. This implies that lack of common vision and win-win relationship was a challenge in a PPP agreement and implementation. Studies by Nijkamp *et al.*, (2002) and Scharle (2002) found out that some of the traditional constraints in the way of a successful realization of a PPP include lack of common vision and win-win relationship.

Multiple Interests of Key Participants

Table 17 establishes whether multiple interests of key participants was a challenge faced in the implementation of PPPs at ZINARA.

Table 17: Multiple Interests of Key Participants

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	4	2.8	2.8	2.8
	Disagree	11	7.7	7.7	10.5
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	4	2.8	2.8	13.3
	Agree	47	33.1	33.1	46.4
	Strongly Agree	76	53.5	53.5	100.0

Total	142	100.0
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Table 17 shows that 53.5% of respondents strongly agreed that challenges faced in implementing PPP at ZINARA included multiple interests of key participants. This was supported by 33.1% of respondents who agreed whilst 2.8% of respondents strongly disagreed, 7.7% of respondents disagreed and 2.8% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. This implies that multiple interests of key participants were a challenge in a PPP agreement and implementation. The same view is also shared by Lindner (1999).

Conflict between Public and Private Sector Officials in PPPs

Table 18 establishes whether conflict between officials in PPPs was a challenge faced in the implementation of PPPs at ZINARA.

Table 18: Conflict between Public and Private Sector Officials in PPPs

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	1	0.7
	Disagree	9	6.3
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	4	2.8
	Agree	36	25.4
	Strongly Agree	92	64.8
	Total	142	100.0

Table 18 shows that 64.8% of respondents strongly agreed that challenges faced in implementing PPP at ZINARA included conflict between officials in PPPs. This was supported by 25.4% of respondents who agreed whilst 0.7% of respondents strongly disagreed, 6.3% of respondents disagreed and 2.8% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. This shows that most of the respondents were of the view that public and private sector officials in PPPs were a challenge in a PPP agreement and implementation. Studies by Nijkamp *et al.*, (2002) and Scharle (2002) found out that conflict between officials in PPPs is a challenge faced in the implementation of PPPs in Africa's public sector.

PPP's and ZINARA's Performance

Apart from questionnaire respondents who were ZINARA Staff, this section also presents findings gathered from 53 interviews with motorists and

residents who reside along the roads where PPP was implemented in particular the Mutare-Plumtree road.

Table 19 shows findings related to PPPs impact on performance (ZINARA staff Responses).

Table 19: PPPs and ZINARA’s Performance

	Safe Travel	Quality of roads	More facilities	Improved efficiency
Mean	4.3380	4.2958	4.2113	4.2394
Std. Error of Mean	.08933	.09039	.09986	.09738
Median	5.0000	5.0000	5.0000	5.0000
Mode	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
Std. Deviation	1.0645	1.0770	1.18998	1.16040
Variance	1.133	1.160	1.416	1.347
Skewness	-1.786	-1.651	-1.545	-1.585
Std. Error of Skewness	.203	.203	.203	.203

Safe Travel to Road Users

Table 19 shows that the mode was 5 representing strongly agree that ZINARA’s PPPs with Group Five a company with a vast experience in management of roads had improved safe travel to road users. This was also reflected by a mean of 4.3380 at a standard deviation of 1.06450. There was little variance of just 1.133. This implies most respondents strongly agreed that PPPs were enabling road users to have a safe travel to their final destination. During interviews with motorists who were using the Plumtree-Mutare road expressed satisfaction on the quality of the road. One respondent said ‘Plumtree-Mutare is safe to travel at night, during the day and at all speeds’. This implies that PPPs had contributed to road safety. These findings are similar to Jamali, (2004) who found out that PPPs improve road infrastructure development.

Improve Quality of Roads

Table 19 shows that the mode was 5 representing strongly agree that ZINARA’s PPPs with Group Five a company with a vast experience in management of roads had improved the quality of roads. This was also reflected by a mean of

4.2958 at a standard deviation of 1.07709. There was little variance of just 1.160. This implies most respondents agreed that PPPs were improving the quality of roads. During interviews with motorists who were using the Plumtree-Mutare road they expressed satisfaction on the quality of the road.

One respondent said ‘Plumtree-Mutare road meets international standards’. This implies that PPPs had contributed to quality of roads. On this, WB (2012) found out that the rationale for the SEPs to support PPPs is based on the claim that PPPs have the potential to close the infrastructure gap by leveraging scarce public funding and introducing private sector technology and innovation to provide better quality public services through improved operational efficiency. This shows that Group Five had managed to transfer skills road infrastructure management.

More Facilities in the Roads

Table 19 shows that the mode was 5 representing strongly agree that ZINARA’s PPPs had improved facilities in the roads. This was also reflected by a mean of 4.2113 at a standard deviation of 1.18998. There was little variance of 1.416. This implies that most respondents agreed that PPPs were improving facilities in the roads. The government was now able to collect tollgate fees which were aiding resources for the road infrastructure. During interviews it was reported that dualisation of roads had improved the enjoyability of driving. This meant that improved facilities through PPPs had met the interest of stakeholders that include the government and road users.

Improved Efficiency in Road Services

Table 19 shows that the mode was 5 representing strongly agree that ZINARA’s PPPs with Group Five had improved efficiency in road services. This was also reflected by a mean of 4.2394 at a standard deviation of 1.16040. There was little variance of 1.347 and a standard error of the mean of 0.9738. This implies most respondents strongly agreed that PPPs were enabling improved efficiency in road services. During interviews, one resident along Plumtree-Mutare road said that “Dualisation of roads and maintenance of roads had improved in

the Plumtree-Mutare road”. Hence, PPPs were seen as improving efficiency in road services. This view is also shared by Linder (1999).

Clean and Attractive Roads

Table 19 shows that the mode was 5 representing strongly agree that ZINARA’s PPPs with Group Five had improved cleanliness and attractiveness of the Plumtree-Mutare road. This was also reflected by a mean of 4.2324 at a standard deviation of 1.14027. There was little variance of just 1.133. This implies most respondents strongly agreed that PPPs were improving cleanliness and attractiveness of the Plumtree-Mutare road. During interviews with motorists who were using the Plumtree-Mutare road expressed satisfaction on the cleanliness and attractiveness of the Plumtree-Mutare road. Interview respondents acknowledged that the Plumtree-Mutare road was clean and attractive. This implies that PPPs had contributed to road cleanliness and attractiveness. These findings are similar to Jamali (2004) who found out that PPPs improve road infrastructure development.

Improve Accountability

Table 19 shows that the mode was 5 representing strongly agree that ZINARA’s PPPs with Group Five had improved accountability in road management. This was also reflected by a mean of 4.3099 at a standard deviation of 1.03952. There was little variance of 1.081 at a standard error mean of 0.08723. This implies most respondents agreed that PPPs were improving ZINARA’s accountability in road management. However, during interviews with motorists it was reported that cases of corruption continue to emerge despite PPPs implementation. Further, the researcher found out that in 2018 ZINARA had lost USD119 million through shady deals by its management. These results show that unaccountability was still being witnessed at ZINARA despite PPPs implementation. These results are contrary to the World Bank (2012) who found out that PPPs significantly improves the governance of SEPs, by bringing a greater focus on performance and accountability.

Improved Revenue Collection

Table 19 shows that the mode was 5 representing strongly agree that ZINARA’s PPPs had improved revenue collection. This was also reflected by a mean of 4.3239 at a standard deviation of 1.06224. There was little variance of 1.128. This implies that most respondents agreed that PPPs were improving revenue collection. The government was now able to collect more tollgate fees which were aiding resources for the road infrastructure. This meant that PPPs had improved revenue collection.

Improved Cost Management Strategies

Table 19 shows that the mode was 5 representing strongly agree that ZINARA’s PPPs with Group Five had improved cost management strategies. This was also reflected by a mean of 4.3169 at a standard deviation of 1.06104. There was little variance of 1.126 at a standard error mean of 0.08904. This implies most respondents agreed that PPPs were improving ZINARA’s cost management. These findings are similar to Jamali (2004) who found out that PPPs reduces SEPs’ transaction costs.

Possible Best Practice of Improving Efficiency Using PPPs

Respondents mentioned that the government staff, working hand in hand with the private sector staff, can learn to be more efficient. Further, it was reported that ZINARA employees can learn entrepreneurial skills. Public sector employees at ZINARA can learn the habits of handling customers well and avoiding wastage of resources. Further, respondents mentioned that ZINARA decision makers to benefit from the commercial dynamism of the private sector. Respondents also mentioned that there is need for legislative framework to facilitate the implementation of PPPs in the delivery of public services. Respondents also said that the board and management of SEPs need to have a better understanding of the principles of PPPs in the provision of road construction. Respondents also mentioned that political leadership in support of PPPs in the country was critical. Before the implementation of PPPs in the provision of road construction respondents said that public needs to

be convinced that such arrangements will benefit the road users. A regulatory mechanism needs to be in place to safeguard the interests of each partner. Respondents mentioned that there should be a high demand for quality road network in order for more roads to be built and maintained.

It was also reported that both partners (public and private) need to be convinced that they will benefit from the partnerships. It was also reported that road users must be willing to make some contributions towards the development and maintenance of roads and the judicial system must be perceived to be effective and impartial for property rights to be assured. Respondents also mentioned that law enforcement must be perceived to be incorruptible in order to effectively deal with corrupt practices. Some respondents said that there should be some quality assurance framework with which to monitor and guide the operations of public enterprises under PPPs. Further, it was reported that the private partner will have to make some profit if the partnerships are to be sustained.

V. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

Factors that influenced ZINARA to adopt PPPs were the need for financial resources, infrastructure development, to improve efficiency, to reduce poverty and to fuel economic growth. ZINARA was faced by challenges in implementing PPP with the Group Five and these were contract renegotiation, performance enforcement, political acceptability, lack of sound regulatory framework, lack of fulfilment of key formation requirements, lack of common vision and win-win relationship, multiple interests of key participants and conflict between public and private sector officials in PPPs. PPPs have aided ZINARA's performance in road services delivery through safe travel to road users, improved quality of roads, more facilities in the roads, improved efficiency in road services, clean and attractive roads, improved revenue collection and improved cost management strategies. The following recommendations emanate from this study:

- i. The government should continue to work with the private sector staff so as to learn to be more efficient.
- ii. Government should put in place a legislative framework to facilitate the implementation of PPPs in the delivery of public services. Political leadership should support implementation of PPPs.
- iii. A regulatory mechanism needs to be in place to safeguard the interests of each partner. In this regard, the judicial system must be perceived to be effective and impartial for property rights to be assured. Law enforcement agents must also be perceived to be incorruptible in order to effectively deal with corrupt practices.
- iv. ZINARA employees should continue to learn entrepreneurial skills so as to improve service delivery.
- v. There should be some quality assurance framework with which to monitor and guide the operations of public enterprises under PPPs.
- vi. Road users should be willing to make some contributions towards the development and maintenance of roads.

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