

What Constitutes the Happiness of the Human Person: Karol Wojtyla's Reinterpretation of the Aristotelian-Thomistic View

Judith Ngihbi

Rivers State University

Faculty of Humanities

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6994-2133>

Corresponding Author's email: mambujudith@gmail.com.

Abstract:

The issues which lie at the background of this research is the perennial philosophical discourse on what constitutes a person's ultimate end. I shall concentrate the discussion on the thought of Karol Wojtyla, who referring to contemporary research complements in this matter the views of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, the result of what is the personalistic understanding of happiness. For all of these thinkers it is important that the human person by nature desires happiness. Happiness, then, is something complete and self-sufficient, and is the end of action. The human Will tends to happiness in a necessary manner, and it is incapable of not wanting happiness. A person cannot choose between being happy and not being happy. In the colloquial sense, not every person desires happiness but a person must arrive at happiness for the reason that happiness constitutes the end of nature. However, all beings that are part of nature should arrive at fulfilment. We may ask why it is that only the rational being is capable of recognizing happiness as a value. We could respond that only a rational being is capable of cognizing whether the good which he possesses may be enough (*sufficiētiaboni*). The discussion has a metaphysical character because it is about pointing out the ultimate reasons for happiness of human person.

Keywords: Happiness, Wojtyla, fulfillment, end, good

Introduction

The theme of happiness falls into the general discourse of classical philosophy on what constitutes the ultimate fulfilment of the human being. In that context, the analysis of fulfilment as the reality that unfolds in the dynamic whole of the person-action relation is not divorced from the personalistic philosophy which puts emphasis on self-determination. Right from the time of Immanuel Kant, the question of autonomy or auto-determination has become key to the interpretation of the category of person. In this paper, I intend to highlight Karol Wojtyla's personalistic interpretation of happiness in this tradition which considers the question of fulfilment from the subjective and objective standpoint.

The metaphysical notion of happiness begins from being and its perfections, from the good which is ontological. The basic thought in this conception is that happiness may be a shared property that only a

rational being that is perfect in its species, fully actualized. One cannot conceive happiness without an objective good. The good is contained in the human being actualization, and is thus the real perfection of the being. In the case of the "de-actualization" of the human being, it leads to the reduction of the objection to completion of his real perfection. This results in a limitation of his objective good. Hence, a reduction of his happiness. Basically, we can elucidate at this juncture that happiness is nothing other than the full actualization of the rational being, indeed the complete actualization of the rationality of the being. Albeit, not in separation from other domains of this kind of being. Aquinas who focused his thought on the metaphysical conception of happiness did not present his view only on the objective perfection of the rational being. He distinguishes the objective nature of happiness from its subjective aspect. He sees perfection as the objective foundation of

happiness. A rational being that is not perfect by the measure of its species and its own individuality cannot be objectively happy. St. Thomas does not overlook the fact that happiness conceived in objective terms is always something subjective, i.e., a real property of a definite subject.

To present a scientific research paper on the above assumptions on the philosophical understanding of happiness in Karol Wojtyła, the following structural procedure has been adopted. This work is divided into three parts. The first part deals with good as an end, the second, *synderesis* as a moral principle and lastly, person as a norm.

1. Good as an End

Karol Wojtyła uses in his analyses about happiness main ideas discovered and developed in Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. It concerns a relation of happiness to human action and its crucial determinants. In his *Lublin lectures*, Wojtyła notes that “in many passages, St. Thomas emphasizes that Aristotle’s thought has its place in this picture, according to whom happiness must consist in the most perfect activity. Both with regard to its subject, i.e. the faculty and power, and with regard to its object” (Wojtyła, 1993, p. 205). Therefore, our analysis of Wojtyła’s principles of happiness Review the concept of happiness developed by Aristotle and Aquinas.

In the Aristotelian tradition, every action and desire has a purpose (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1182b1): Ends are conceived by their seekers to be desired goods. Thus, every end is a good one. No action or capacity exists without Sense. Since the good is the end in every capacity, it follows that the end of the best desire will be the best good (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1182b1). Comprehended good occurs in all the categories-in substance, quality, quantity, time, place, and relation. It is obvious from the Aristotelian categories that the term ‘good’ is used in different senses. Although usually we speak about good ends subjectively, in other words, relatively to ourselves, and the word ‘good’ is not univocal. It is possible to specify the objective sense of good.

In the thoughts of Aristotle and Aquinas such a good is understood as that at which all activities are aimed. It means that particular kinds of actions are done for the sake of attaining various ends. Human

action is ordered to an end. We act for the sake of an end insofar as we have a reason for action (Aquinas, 2004, p. 198). There are some ends for the sake of which all actions are performed (Aquinas, 193, p. 198). Aristotle envisaged man’s good in terms of the object of human action, as the end of human action, the goal to which human person tends. This concept of good is called the teleological concept of good (Gr. *teleos* means “the end”). On the basis of this thought in Middle Ages St. Thomas Aquinas has distinguished between honest good (*bonum honestum*), useful good (*bonum utile*), and desirable good (*bonum delectabile*).

Following Aristotle, it can also be said that good is used in reference to honourable entities, praiseworthy actions and excellent capacities (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1184a1): In a sense, we can speak of the honourable entities, as the most excellent and as such supremely good or even divine beings. To this supreme good, we can consider the highest of *bonum honestum* but also it is the highest of the proper objects of desire to which the soul, through its capacities, is attracted. In this particular sense, there can be a coincidence of the *bonum honestum* and *bonum delectabile*. We may say that the ultimate end is that beyond which the agent seeks nothing else (Aquinas, 1975, p. 35).

The highest good therefore fulfils the desires of the seekers of good as the highest end. This relation of the highest good and the desire for the highest good is the first principle of happiness since happiness is taken to be the fulfilment of the highest end which is sought after. From another perspective, the seeking of this fulfilment requires the use of good means to the effect that *bonum utile* is related to the other two kinds of good. We can express this tripartite relationship in terms of causality whereby the highest good is taken to be the final good (final cause) which draws the attraction of human subject by virtue of its nature (formal cause) such that the seeker or human subject in search of fulfilment, actively (efficient cause) uses those means (material cause) which will help him or her achieve this delight. This schema is exemplified in search of any good whatsoever, for instance a person who is in search of honour or reputation first considers it as an excellent good (final cause), and the good nature (formal cause) of honour appeals to him as desirable. He engages himself (efficient cause) in

honourable activities (material cause) in order to obtain honour.

According to Aristotle, another feature of the good is that it is praiseworthy (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1184a1). It acquires some moral character such that it is often the case that people are encouraged to be good and those who lack this good character in their actions are liability. Finally the capacities or the faculties can as well be said to be good with respect to their functionality- for example, the knife is said to be good to the extent that it cuts sharply. This is a way of understanding the excellent knife in terms of utility (*bonum utile*) but also virtually all good means are spoken of in this sense of utility. It can also be said that some goods are means to the extent that they are productive of other goods. For instance, exercise is good as it is productive of another good, namely health. Such goods are not goods in themselves but they are goods with respect to what they produce. Fortune is good to the extent that it produces a good end. Happiness is not seen as good in this sense of utility or means because it is an end in itself rather than a means to another good. Therefore, there are goods which are ends and goods which are means to ends. There are also goods which are absolutely desirable everywhere and some are not desired by everyone even if they are absolutely good in themselves.

The differentiation between Absolute good in itself (*bonum honestum*) and goods with respect to their desirability (*bonum delectabile*) can be helpful in the different understandings of happiness as a good end. In the case of desirability, we can confuse pleasure with happiness but in the case of honest good in itself, the consideration of happiness as an end springs from the nature of the good rather than from the subjective calculus of its desirability. It is assumed that if happiness is good as an end by its nature, then it should also be desirable by all persons but this relationship is only determined by the active fulfilment of the good means to this end such that happiness as a good end (*honestum*) is a desirable good end (*delectabile*) which requires a means productive of this end (*utile*) in order to realize it.

Suppose we speak of health as a means to happiness and then we go on to equate health with happiness. Both are considered ends without distinguishing between the relationship of health and happiness

with respect to ends and means. On this assumption, someone can begin to see health as an ultimate end, (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1184a1) and then reconstructs the above considerations of good means and good ends as follows: The end as good is always more preferable to any of the various means to attain it. In this case, health is better than the means to health (medication, exercise, etc). The principle of end is such that “that thing is better for the sake of which the rest are.” Since the complete ends are better than that which are incomplete (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1184a1). Note here that in speaking of a complete good, we mean a good which leaves us in need of nothing in the last analysis. An incomplete good may be present but still, we are in need of something. This obvious relationship obtains not only in the above case of health as an end but also when we take another example like justice as an end. We shall as well obtain the same conclusion to the effect that justice is more desirable than the means to justice.

Now, let us take both health and justice as means to another end. Let us see happiness as the end of both (health and justice). Let us consider the fact that we have health and justice, and we still need something besides health and justice. With respect to the two, happiness is of a higher value. It is the ultimate end of the two other goods (health and justice) since when we have complete happiness, we are surely both health and justice, otherwise, we ought also be less fulfilled (less happiness). Here, happiness is the primary thing we are looking for in seeking for health and justice. It is also the final end.

The final end is the good end which gives the reason for the search for other intermediate goods leading to it. To possess this ultimate good we have to search for it indirectly through the other intermediate good means. This good is the ultimate end, which we call happiness. The good end as the ultimate principle of happiness comprises other intermediate good means but not vice versa. In relation to these other intermediate goods, it is the best good in terms of value. The intermediate good means happiness cannot be said to be the last end but they can in themselves have other intermediaries which leaves us with a sort of hierarchy of goods, at the end of which we have happiness as the final good. Everyone wants what is best for them, and that is the purpose of life.

Notably, by Aristotle there are specific goods in the soul i.e the virtues, some in the body, i.e. health, beauty; and some external: wealth, prestige, office, and so on. Of all these the best goods are found in the soul and these goods are divided into three: wisdom, excellence, and pleasure (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1184b1). Underpinning these with happiness to me seems to be the end of the goods. Happiness could be defined as doing well and living well. The sense of end is manifold, for instance, we may speak of end in terms of activity or use. Considering having sight, the use is more desirable than having it. Here the use is the end. Same with hearing, it is more useful hearing than just having the ear. All uses in this sense can express a certain end but this is not the way we speak of happiness as an end. Happiness is not spoken as an end due to its utility for it will be asked, “what is the use of happiness?”, to which we shall in fact have no other response than repeat simply “for the sake of happiness.”

To make this argument more evident, we may apply a method in seeking this ultimate good, maybe by comparison. Let us compare happiness as an end, (which constitutes all the intermediate goods leading to it), with other goods, which are also ends but which can also be without having happiness as well. Consider one of the examples above, such as the means to health and health itself: When we queried which is the end, health or the means to health; surely we shall say health is the ultimate good with respect to its means (i.e. exercise or medication). An ultimate good is not supposed to have another ultimate good after it, in which case an absurdity ensues. If we find some other ultimate good, then the former is no longer the ultimate good but rather a penultimate good. This is the case between health and happiness as we saw above.

We can say that happiness as an end is a composition of other intermediate means and as good. It is the end of the other goods, given that the principle of the good as an end implies that the last end is also the last good just as the intermediate end is also an intermediate good. Happiness as an end is not to be considered as something distinct from the intermediate goods that leads to it but rather as comprising those intermediate goods related to it as means to its completion. Living well (e.g. healthy, wealthy, wisely etc) is nothing more than being happy. Being happy then, constitutes living well,

(Aristotle, 1984, p. 1185a1) and living well is living in accordance with the excellences that a happy person is said to possess. So then happiness is the end and ultimate good.

As happiness is the ultimate good and the end, it is observed that it must be discovered in what is complete in a being. It is only found in a person whose nature is fulfilled in a good person, or a virtuous human being. Happiness is the exercise of complete excellence of the human being. It consists not in the acquisition of much property but rather in the manner of the disposition of the soul. If the end of each being is always better than the incomplete thing, then the search for this end is the rational orientation of each being. For everything that comes into being does so for the sake of the end. As possessing reason, human nature fulfils its end by the rational choice for the end of man. If this end of man is the ultimate goal towards which all other means are directed, then we can speak of it in terms of fulfilment, otherwise called happiness.

Karol Wojtyla has developed a teleological conception of good. He enriched it through analysis of free choice, which is necessary for a person to realize his happiness. According to Karol Wojtyla’s conception of the good, the choice for the good is uniquely a human choice. There is no substitution of choice and decision for the drive toward good which is suitable for a person. Choosing a better (i.e. more good) object, also activates our human faculties (i.e will) more properly, such that the person, who chooses and decides is said to become a better (i.e. more good) person. If we understand choice as a human act, then this act of choice has the human person as its actor. But the capacity to realize this human act (i.e. good choice) is determined by a person’s cognitive maturity and his volitive freedom to pursue his/her authentic values towards the good. This maturity is best expressed at the moment of decision (Wojtyla, 1979, p. 127). Decision becomes the gateway that a person has to pass on towards the good. This process has to be a continuum even when the person feels engulfed with the good, by the glorified end of his striving.

In fact the more he becomes engulfed, the more fundamental is the good and vice versa. Although there may be some hurdles in approaching this good, albeit this hurdle will never be achieved without the person going beyond the borderline,

transgressing his own restriction. The ability of the will directs us towards a cool aloofness either towards its object or towards its values. However, this does not automatically implicate a neutral ground on values, given that the purpose of every human choice and action (e.g. act of choice) is the good as understood by the person who makes the choice. Wojtyla makes this connection between choice and purpose of choice in the following way: “On the contrary, it lies in the nature of every ‘I will’ --- [which is always object oriented and consist in an ‘I want something’] that it is constantly prepared to come out towards a good” (Wojtyla, 1979, p. 127). Though this willingness is more primitive and more important to the will (faculty) to take decisions and this ability implicates not only an instinct of self-preservation (i.e good for me) but more fundamentally the recognition of the “truth about the good” (Heale, 2013), as no one wills evil for himself or herself but one can be mistaken about the perceived good.

It therefore implies that the question about happiness as the ultimate end of man requires not only freedom to choose but also moral or virtues which accompany self-determination towards activities following from the recognition of the good, appropriate for the optimal realization of personal flourishing. When this is neglected our desire to reach happiness, as the ultimate good becomes frustrated. When I desire something, I approach the object that is presented, or rather which presents itself to my attention as a good and thus shows its value. We are motivated towards the object of the good, thus striving after the value that thereby becomes the end. The good as value which we strive after or rather which is desired fits into one of the three Thomistic kinds of goods, namely *bonumdelectabile*. This desired good is teleologically significant in our consideration of the good as an end as we can speak of such a good as the aim or the purpose for which an act of choice is made.

When Aristotle identified good with the aim he only followed consistently in his reasoning the evidence available in elementary experiences. In the rational order, the faculty of the will not only “desires” (i.e. is appetitive) but also “decides” (i.e. is personal) for the good, that is, makes a self-determined choice for this good. The differences of value amongst

desirable goods rely not only on the subject (appetitive) aspect of *bonumdelectabile*, but also on the objective ‘truth of the good’ (akin to Aquinas’ *bonumhonestum*). In this new interpretation of Wojtyla about truth of the good, we can understand how good as an end leads to the rational (i.e. cognitive and volitive) fulfilment of human nature, transcending the natural order of *bonumdelectabile* to the personal order of cognizing the truth of the good. This self-transcending is made possible by entering into communion with the *bonumdelectabile*(Taylor, 2009-2010).

2. *Synderesis* as a Moral Principle

“*Synderesis*” in scholastic moral philosophy, refers to the habitual disposition of the practical intellect to intuitively acknowledge the innate principle in the moral consciousness of every person which directs the agent to good and restrains him from evil. St Thomas Aquinas played a significant role in the clarification of this concept (Aquinas, 2012, p. 255). According to its Greek roots, *synderesis* implicates the natural preservation or inborn nature when nature is understood as good and as such should be preserved. In this way, it refers to the natural appetite for the good of nature and conversely the natural aversion. This natural and habitual inclination to good presupposes the knowledge of the good. It is connected with conscience (*con-scientia*, i.e. with knowledge). Perceived by our conscience, the good should not be neglected and its opposite, ‘evil’ should evoke shame or guilt feelings naturally. Therefore, *synderesis* and conscience (*conscientia*) are correlated.

Nonetheless, the usage of *synderesis* for the scholastics was quite distinct from *conscientia*, and to a slight extent. According to Jerome, *synderesis* is rather a “*scintilla consientiae*”- that is, the spark-from which the light of conscience arises. Thus Jeremy Taylor calls it “the spark or fire put into the heart of humans,” and as such *synderesis*, warms up the conscience concerning the deed done, as though bringing fuel to this fire (Taylor, 2005). As distinct from *synderesis*, *conscientia* is applied to particular behaviour of a person to good or evil action. As is to be seen, both functions of *synderesis* and conscience partake in human subjectivity of moral actions such that the drama of good and evil is

played out from the inner part of the human person with regard to his actions.

According to Wojtyła's discourse on consciousness in his work *The Acting Person*, we can understand *synderesis* as awareness of the moral principle of good and evil. *Synderesis* guarantees that human consciousness is able to judge concrete decisions and actions at the angle of good and evil. Therefore consciousness can be understood as awareness of oneself. Owing to its mirroring function closely related to self-knowledge, consciousness, basing on *synderesis*, allows us, on the one hand, to gain an objective awareness of the good or evil that we are the agent of in any particular action (Wojtyła, 1979, p. 49). Similarly on the other hand, we experience the reflexivity of the good and evil in either a happy life or an unhappy life, which is manifested in the actualization and non-actualization of our nature as human beings. It is a man who experiences himself as good and evil. *Synderesis* is the intuitive faculty which judges the good from the evil.

According to Thomas Aquinas, however, *synderesis* is distinctly an intellectual habit as it is connected with practical reason, which points out the right direction for action. Aquinas, places both *Synderesis* and *conscientia* under the intellectual powers. The interpretation of *synderesis* as an intellectual habit by Aquinas does not coincide with Bonaventure's interpretation of *synderesis* rather as a volitional habit. Bonaventure elucidates that *conscientia* and *synderesis* are distinguished in terms of judgement of the good and willing the good. *Synderesis* is a natural appetency to will the good and avoid evil whereas *conscientia* is a natural judgement that good is what should be done. For him, God has given a double rule of right in human nature. One for judging rightly and this is the moral strength of conscience. The second for right volition which is the moral strength of *synderesis*, whose function is to dissuade from evil and stimulate to good.

The difference between Aquinas and Bonaventure in the understanding of *synderesis* does not affect our argument that as a principle of happiness. *Synderesis* attracts us to the happy life since it commands that the good, which leads to the natural preservation of our happy life, should be realized.

Joseph Aguaus presents Wojtyła's interpretation of the relationship between *synderesis* and conscience as follows: "The human act is transformed into the willing and selecting of a "real good" in conscience. It is conscience, through its first synderetic rule: "do good and stay away from evil" (Aguaus, 2013). Conscience directs the person towards the truth of the good which *synderesis* naturally inclines him to do and so happiness is actualized in the direction of a good willed and chosen in the light of veracity. It is important to see here that Wojtyła according to Aguaus blends the views of both Aquinas and Bonaventure as he indicates that the conscience admonishes us to choose the real good which *synderesis* inclines us to do in the light of truth. So conscience is certainly an intellectual practical reason which is activated in the light of truthfulness whereas *synderesis* is linked with an appetency towards the good. Appetency in Wojtyła's philosophy is not simply a free natural drive but it is based on responsibility for actions. Wojtyła locates the source of this responsibility in freedom of the person to determine himself towards the good to be done and resolve against evil.

In this way Wojtyła relates anthropology (self-determination) to his ethics (responsibility) and axiology (value of the good). When the conscience passes a judgment on the act, it does so in line with moral values. At first it investigates the truth, and then it passes a judgment. So the role of conscience is to evaluate and recognize the true moral good. Though Wojtyła thinks, that conscience may falter in this effort and maybe in disaccord with the reality of the good. Conscience is truthful and is always in correlation with the will to do good. In Wojtyła, truth and good become correlated with the role of the conscience and *synderesis* in moral actions which lead to a happy life.

The human act is transformed into the willingness and selection of a "real good" in conscience." Through its first principle: "do good, avoid evil," conscience directs the person to choose and will the good, to go beyond the self in the direction of the true good. The person fulfils himself when he performs a good action, a good that is in accordance with a true and good conscience. When the object of choice is a true good, then the human action is good and when the object of choice is a false good then the human action is bad or evil (Aguaus, 2013). The

human being becomes either good or bad depending on the morality of his actions. Self-fulfilment depends on the fulfilment or performance of a truly good act. Man's act is actualized in his action. He becomes either good or evil depending on the moral value of the act performed.

St Paul's explaining the meaning of conscience says it is a moral judgement about man and his actions. "This judgement will take place on that day when, according to the gospel, God judges the secrets of men by Christ Jesus" (Rom 2:16). This judgement is practical because it shows what ought to do and not. However it discloses the objective and universal demands of the moral good. Man must act in accordance with it. "If man acts against this judgement or, in a case where he lacks certainty about the rightness and goodness of a determined act, still performs that act, he stands condemned by his conscience, the proximate norm of morality" (John Paul II, 1993, no 59-60). Since morality deals with the practical good, it focuses on the realization of the good in human actions, which is a means of attaining fulfilment of desired ends, which is happiness. Nonetheless, this good to be done is judged by the human conscience from the first moral principle of *synderesis*, which says that good must be done and evil avoided. In this way, *synderesis* and conscience play significant moral roles with regard to the realization of human happiness.

3. Person as a Norm

According to Modras, Karol Wojtyla in his theory of anthropology says: "The reality of morality, especially duty, indicates that at the basis of morality one finds man as a person" (Modras, 1969). Personhood is in relation to morality and cannot be replaced by other more general concepts. No other class can take the position of person as the subjective and centre of morality. Man stands above every other creature. This is a position which is inexpressible and absolute as personhood itself. Social morality cannot reduce the centrality of personhood but can only enrich it. "The proper measures of the greatness of every human being are contained in morality." (Modras, 1969, p. 692).

Wojtyla agrees that moral truthfulness can be objectively established as normative, yet he observes that: "Moral truthfulness however, is not

enough. It is not sufficient to know if a normative claim is morally true or false, or to be able to roughly state that "lying is morally evil" or "being honest is morally desirable." From "being honest is ethically good" to "I should be honest," and from "lying is morally evil" to "I should avoid lying," there should be a transition" (Modras, 1969, p. 131). Truth overcomes the tension that may exist between the objective order of norms and the inner freedom of the person. Wojtyla elucidates that the fundamental value of norms lies in the truthfulness of the good they objectify and not in the generation of duties. Speaking about the truthfulness of the conscience which is subjective, we need to take into account whether standards and the good they objectify are objectively true. Objective moral standards that are based on the good must serve as the foundation for all obligations and duties. Wojtyla draws a connection between this and man's life by stating, in accordance with St. Thomas' philosophy. "The essence of moral life is the 'lived experience' of the truth of the good realized in action and the realization in that action of the good subjected to the criterion of reason and thus placed in the light of truth" (Modras, 1969, p. 131).

Wojtyla went further to say that the duty is a personal reality because man has an inherent obligation to all other people. The conscience and the interpersonal source of duties are related and the objective order of moral norms, which means its application, extends far beyond an individual person and his concrete innerness. The "personalistic norm" by Wojtyla requires a concept of person, concept of dignity and norm of love. Two norms are used here. The norm of dignity and love. In the negative sense the principle of this norm treats man as an end in itself and not as an object of use. In the positive sense, person is treated with the proper sense of love. Human person ought to be loved because of the dignity of the human person. Dignity of the person requires an active response. The dignity of a human person is the value of the highest rank.

Wojtyla confronts the thoughts of Kant and the utilitarian idea of moral norm. Kant understood norm as the categorical imperative, the *a priori* form of practical reason. His acceptance of the *a priori* form of the practical reason as the norm is to be understood as a law which is established by the

reason itself. Kant's position is a response to Hume who says that the mind is the subject of ideas having no influence on will with obligation. Kant points to the existence of the form with practical reason which is "pure" obligation alone. The form which is *a priori* is independent of all experience in correlation to the object and the subject. It is innate to the practical reason *per se*, is imperative and it is in this imperative role that the reason is at the same time the will in the autonomy proper to it, in the power of self-constitution. On the basis of experience, to say something about practical reason as an autonomous subject of activity, we have to take into account the immanence of reason in the human being.

Kant observes that the empiricist conception intuited happiness which accompanied the utilitarian argument following Hume. This norm was envisaged as distinct from the moral norm of Aristotle or Aquinas conception of philosophy. His verdict was that the practical reason was seen as the subject of intellectual activity which is divided from its own immanence in human beings. Happiness for Kant was understood as the sum of sensual pleasure. It was stated that even if such a sum may be conceived in the empiricist approach, the subjectivistic analysis of happiness should not be simplified by this sum (Wojtyla, 1993, p. 280). Kant's contradiction of the norm and happiness concerns reason and the senses which are levels of consciousness which are not immanently infused into the whole of man, the rational- sensual human being.

This contradiction of norm and happiness is made explicit when analyzing the pure practical reason, as an analysis of the conception of "norm" and "morality," of "virtue" and more so, of "pleasure" and "happiness." The first content cannot be reduced to the second. Kant's entire anti-eudemonistic thesis may be reduced, as we see, to the difference in the content of the two concepts, "happiness" and "moral norm" (Wojtyla, 1993, p. 280). Real man who aspires to happiness is at the same time directed by moral norms. Now we may ask why man should direct himself to a moral norm in order to obtain happiness. A suitable answer to this question would be tantamount to a position of full eudaimonism.

Besides this sort of position, one may point to yet another moderate position. A man desires to obtain happiness, and at the same time, and in parallel to this desire, he directs himself by moral norms, without treating these norms as a means to obtaining happiness (Wojtyla, 1993, p. 281). Consequently, considering the fact whether one aspires to happiness by the way of morality taking away some of morality's essential significance or in other word does morality concern the normal road to happiness, the pathway to life. The relation of norm to happiness is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is a conception of happiness, as the sum of pleasures. According to Bentham, the sum of pleasure is maximization for the greatest number of persons. This pleasure is purely subjective, although it cannot define the objective good. There is an error in the utilitarian conception of the good, confusing the object and the subjective good. This error is carried in the area of the obligation and the norm, illustrating the subjective good as the proper end.

This ethics was connected with the philosophy of the good. In Hume's view there arises a distortion of human nature, a conception of the correlation of the reason to the human being and in the conception of the function that the reason can and should perform in man. The reason plays the role of sorting object which will bring an effective role to the one who is acting. This normative function is present in the reason as a particular manifestation of its grounded immanence in the human being. At the same time as a manifestation of its instrumental position with respect to the entire variety of man's experience. The breaking up of a human being deprived the unity that made up its nature, thus reducing man to a plurality of living experiences and external symptoms. Thus with elementary experience, it calls for the need of the norm and the need for the moral regulation in man.

Having been speaking about utilitarianism, they are not in line with elementary experience. Thus the principle of advantage understood as the calculus of pleasure seems to be a conception with idealistic thought, derived more from an intellectual analysis than from observation of the human being and morality, which is proper to him (Wojtyla, 1993, p. 286). Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas give an explanation of happiness to the moral norm which is free from idealism and contradiction. This relation

of happiness to morality is well explained by St. Thomas as he treats it in relation to a real human person. Man as a whole, as a rational being, specifying that our reason acts due to its immanence with respect to this being. Aristotle's and St. Thomas' explanation of happiness is free from antinomy, for they understood happiness in a more objective sense. They understood it as the end that the rational being must have when he begins to direct acts in a rational manner.

The ambition or yearning for happiness is an inclination of a rational nature, and happiness comprises in full and in all ways mature actualization of this nature. The moral norm has its object which is the moral good of human action. It directly has an end which is man's happiness. If we do not agree with the idea that morality and moral norm do not result in the actualization of the human being, which is the rational being, it would seem onerous. If the norm, which is an act of the reason, were not set at the actualization of the rational being, in a certain sense, of the reason itself as a specific property strictly immanent to the human being, we would then be dealing with a contradiction opposed to the very nature of the reason and its activity (Wojtyla, 1993, p. 286).

Happiness as an objective perfection of the rational being is not the same as the norm that it consists of. Aristotle and Aquinas are looking for a justification for the moral norm in a pure rational way. Ethics which is seen as purely a normative science by its essence is not a logic of pure norms. If the norms are to serve the perfection of the human being, and if they are to serve happiness in a more objective sense, then ethics must be connected to the human being. It attains this by being thoroughly joined with the philosophy of being, and later with philosophical anthropology. Morality and happiness are interwoven in relation to the real human being, thus permeating each other.

St Thomas formulated quite a different rule in the field of happiness and the moral norm that the desire for happiness is the inclination to the rational nature itself, and the establishing of norms is an act of reason. Reason which is immanent must be in accord with the inclination of nature. Eudaimonistic ethics disagree that moral good and happiness are similar. From the holistic conception of the rational being it affirms a clear convergence between the

morality based on the rational norm and man's aspiration to happiness in the objective sense.

Notably, in his appreciation of the philosophical passage from the moral value of the good to the personalistic normativity of the good, Karol Wojtyla is in opposition to both the utilitarian empiricism and the Kantian formalism, as it shows only one aspect of modern idealism. Wojtyla harps on his opposition to utilitarianism, and indirectly, the opposition to the source of its philosophical and methodological force, which is empiricism. There is also opposition to Kantian formalism, which seems to show only one aspect of modern idealism i.e. a particular object is inherent in its holistic and integral structure.

To grasp the detail cannot ignore the grasp of the whole. Often it is only this one aspect that is called idealism, without perceiving or putting proper store upon the idealistic elements inherent in empiricism under the veil of caution or as an end is a complete being whose completeness is immanent in its whole structure" (Wojtyla, 1993, p. 222). So we cannot overlook the grasp of the whole, thus if we ignore the whole, it means we are dealing with another aspect of idealism. It is in this sense that both utilitarianism and formalism is erroneous, that is, in the incomplete and disintegrated vision of reality, and especially of the reality which primarily concerned the reality of man. The person as the norm of human reality becomes as it were the fundamental basis for the consideration of happiness in the philosophy of Karol Wojtyla. Therefore, the interpretation given by Kant and Hume were the ideas of Wojtyla.

Conclusion

The idea of happiness fits into the larger discussion in classical philosophy on what defines a person's ultimate fulfillment. The analysis of fulfillment in this framework, as the reality that develops in the dynamic whole of the person-action interaction, is not disconnected from the personalistic philosophy, which emphasizes self-determination. The ontologically excellent, from which the metaphysical idea of happiness derives, is being and all of its perfections. The fundamental idea behind this theory is that only a rational being that is fully actualized and flawless in its species may share in enjoyment. Consequently, our examination of

Wojtyla's guidelines for happiness Review Aristotle's and Aquinas' definition of happiness.

Bibliography

Aquinas, St. Thomas. *Summa Theologica*, in: [http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/1225-1274,_Thomas_Aquinas,_Summa_Theologiae_\[1\],_EN.pdf](http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/1225-1274,_Thomas_Aquinas,_Summa_Theologiae_[1],_EN.pdf).

Aquinas, T. (1975). *Summa Contra Gentiles*. Translated by Vernon J. Bourke, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame press.

Aquinas, T. (2012). *Happiness*. Translated by Davies Brian, in: *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*. Edited by Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump, Oxford: Oxford University press.

Aquinas, T. (2012). *Conscience and Synderesis*. Translated by Tobias Hoffmann, in: *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*. Edited by Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump, Oxford: Oxford University press.

Aristotle. (1984). *Nicomachean Ethics*. Translated by W. D. Ross, in: *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Aguaus J.J. "Ethics and Moral Philosophy of Karol Wojtyla", *Kritike* Volume Seven No. 2 (June 2013) 115-137.

Henle, R. J, (editor, 1993). *St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae I-II; qq. 90-97: The Treatise on Law*. London: University Of Notre Dame Press.

John Paul II. (1981). *The Whole Truth About Man: John Paul II to University Faculties and Students*. Edited by James V. Schall, Boston, MA: Daughters of St. Paul.

John Paul II. (1995). *The Gospel of Life*. New York: Random House.

John Paul II. (1996). *The Papal Encyclicals of John Paul II*. Edited with introduction by J. Michael Miller, C.S.B., Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor.

John Paul II. (1998). *Fides et Ratio*, (encyclical). Rome: Liberia Editrice Vaticana.

John Paul II. (1999). *Gift and Mystery*. New York: Image Books.

John Paul II. (2004). *Rise, Let Us Be On Our Way*. New York: Warner Books.

Jeremy, T. (2005). *The Rule of Conscience*. Oxford: Text Creation Partnership.

Modras, R. (1969). *The Moral Philosophy of Pope John Paul II*. Saint Louis University.

Spaemann, R. (2005). *Happiness and Benevolence*. Translated by Jeremiah Alberg, Edinburgh: T & T Clark Publishers.

Stephens, C. (2013). *A Thomistic Understanding of Happiness*. Australia: University of Notre Dame.

Taylor, J. "Beyond Nature: Karol Wojtyla's Development of the Traditional Definition of Personhood" *The Review of Metaphysics*, Volume LXIII, (September 2009-June 2010).

Wojtyla, K. (1969). Problem doswiadczenia w etyce [The Problem of Experience in Ethics]. *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 17. no 2 (pp. 5-24).

Wojtyla, K. (1979). *The Acting Person*. Translated by Andrzej Potocki, edited by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Dordrecht-Boston: Reidel.

Wojtyla, K. (1981). *Love and Responsibility*. Translated by H. T. Willetts, San Francisco: Ignatius Press.

Wojtyla, K. (1986), *Wykłady lubelskie [Lublin Lecture]*, ed. by T. Styczeń, J.W. Gałkowski, A. Rodziński, A. Szostek, Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL (I use the unpublished translation of H. McDonald).

Wojtyla, K. (1993). *Catholic Thought from Lublin, vol. 4: Karol Wojtyla. Person and Community: Selected Essays*. Translated by Theresa Sandok. New York: Peter Lang.

Wojtyla, K. (1993). In Search of the Basis of Perfectionism in Ethics. In Andrew Wozniki, *Catholic Thought from Lublin, vol. 4: Karol Wojtyla, Person and Community: Selected Essays*. Translated by Theresa Sandok. New York: Peter-Lang (pp. 45-55).

Wojtyla, K. (2011). *Man in the Field of Responsibility*. Translated by Kenneth W. Kemp, Zuzanna Maslanka Kieron, with introduction by Fr. Alfred Wierzbicki, Chicago: St. Augustine's Press.

Wojtyla, K. (2016). *Considerations on the Essence of Man*. Translated by John Grondelski, Lublin-Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomaza z Akwinu.

Wojtyla, K. (2017). *Ethics Prima. Elementarz Etyczny*. Translated by Hugh McDonald, Lublin-Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu. <http://www.Pursuit-of-happiness.org>.

<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/anamnesis>