International Journal of Scientific Research and Engineering Development-– Volume 8 Issue 4, July - Aug 2025
Available at www.ijsred.com

RESEARCH ARTICLE OPEN ACCESS

Social and Economic Impact of Operation Safe Corridor on The Livelihoods of Rehabilitated Insurgents in Borno State

Hamid Suleiman Abbo
Department of History and International Studies, Federal University Lokoja, Nigeria
Email: babaabbo101@gmail.com

----------**********----------

Abstract:

This study Examine the social and economic impact of operation safe corridor on the livelihoods of rehabilitated insurgents in Borno State. The study *utilized a survey research design involving 374 respondents, including ex-Boko Haram members, OPSC personnel, community leaders, NGOs/CSOs, security agencies, and affected communities in Borno State, Nigeria. Data were collected through structured questionnaires and in-depth interviews. Logistic regression was used to identify predictors of the program's success. Results indicate that 51.1% of respondents rated OPSC's deradicalization effectiveness as "Good," while 48.9% rated it "Poor." Reintegration success was rated "Good" by 65% and "Poor" by 35%. Perceptions of the program's socio-economic impact were split, with 49.2% viewing it positively and 50.8% negatively. Predictors of effectiveness included gender, age, education, employment status, marital status, and ethnicity. Males, individuals with secondary education, and Fulani respondents had more positive perceptions of the program, while females, those with no formal education, and single individuals viewed it less favorably. The effectiveness of OPSC is perceived differently based on socio-demographic factors, with gender, education, and employment status playing significant roles. Addressing gender disparities, engaging youth, enhancing educational support, and focusing on the needs of specific demographic groups are key to improving the program's outcomes. The work recommends that to enhance program effectiveness, the study recommends developing gender-sensitive strategies, improving youth engagement, offering educational support, and providing additional resources for self-employed participants. Furthermore, targeted strategies for single individuals, new residents, and ethnic communities should be developed to foster broader acceptance and engagement.*

Keywords **— Reintegration, Peacebuilding, Deradicalization**

----------**********----------

INTRODUCTION

The continuous use of the kinetic approach years after the start of the implementation of "Operation Safe Corridor" Program suggests that combining both approaches could yet be another promising strategy in confronting violent conflict and insurgency in the NE. This throws up the empirical question - going forward, which strategy should be adopted by the Nigerian Government? The search for the right answer to the above question is the focus of this study. However, the effort can only be fruitful if it is informed by a sound understanding of the underlying philosophy, assumptions, and implementation framework as well as an evidence-based evaluation of its outcomes after about many years of implementation.

Conventional knowledge suggests Nigeria 's reputation as it concerns the deployment of coercive state apparatus to enforce social order precedes it. Over time, it has become some sort of unspoken law that the government deploy security forces at the slightest provocation. While this approach is known

to be effective in containing the spread of conflicts, its inability to satisfactorily counter the influence of Boko Haram compelled the government to review its counterinsurgency strategy to include legislative and policy frameworks in 2016 (Isidore, 2013). For the purpose of this analysis, counterinsurgency is understood to mean the combination of efforts targeted at countering the influence of insurgents. In this sense, counterinsurgency is not exclusively a military endeavor, it also includes non-militarized strategies like Nigeria prison program for low-risk Boko Haram combatants. As rightly captured in the above definition of counterinsurgency, the prison-program is designed to complement military campaigns (Operation Zaman Lafiya Dole and Operation Lafiya Dole) by affording pathways for active or captured Boko Haram combatants to defect. The implementation of the program also reflects Nigeria desperate resolve to counter the influence of the insurgents. Although they vary in degree of comprehension and context, the logic behind the adoption of non-military means derives from the limitations of military campaigns to effectively match the firepower of Boko Haram, and to explore alternative measures in light of the protracted nature of the war on insurgency (Agbiboa, 2013). It on the above background the study seeks to access the impact of Operation Safe Corridor Operation on deradicalization and reintegration of insurgents of Boko Haram members in Borno State, North Eest Nigeria. The Operation Safe Corridor is designed as a multi-sector approach involving 13 key government agencies (including the Office of the National Security Adviser, the Nigerian Prisons Service, Nigerian Police Force, Department of Security Services, Nigerian Immigration Service, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, National Emergency Management Agency, National Identity Management Commission, Armed Forces, National Orientation Agency, National Youth Service Corp, National Directorate of Employment and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps) to deradicalize, rehabilitate, and reintegrate defectors (Nwankpa 2019). Unlike the previous programs, the defectors are now streamlined into two categories: “high-risk” and “low-risk defectors”. While the high-risk defectors are to undergo prosecution, the low-risk defectors are exposed to rehabilitation and reintegration exercises (Felbab-Brown 2018).

The program which is housed across selected prisons across the country principally targets “repentant insurgents”, and not the community, for a 52-week intensive exercise. The program combines Islamic reorientation, psychological counseling and therapy, skill acquisition, and payment of seed money to deradicalized combatants (Faisal et al, 2019; Nwankpa 2019; Felbab-Brown 2018). It is expected that the reintegrated individuals would be monitored after the military would have collected their DNA and biometrics as a measure to prevent recidivism and ensure that they no longer constitute a security threat.

This insecurity may also trigger long-term consequences in the region, as Nigeria serves as Africa’s largest supplier of staple cereals (USAID, 2014). The health sector has also received its own share as the number of injured persons is increasing with little or no facilities to cater for them as well as health workers abandoning their posts for fear of being killed. The killings and abduction of school children and college students by the sect have forced the closure of schools indefinitely and the withdrawal of children and wards by parents from schools still operating, therefore denying them access to education. There are inadequate shelters for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and yet, the number of IDPs is increasing drastically. As much as it may be agreed that the northeast is the epicenter of the insurgency, its effects reverberate throughout the entire country. (Awortu, 2015).

For more than a decade, Nigeria has been containing the terrorist activities of Boko Haram (BH) and its

breakaway factions in the Northeast. One of the Nigerian State's responses to the group's threat in recent times is the establishment of a military-led deradicalization and reintegration program called Operation Safe Corridor Operation (OPSC). Despite Nigeria's troubled history with implementing non-kinetic strategies, the Office of the National Security Adviser in 2016 broadened Nigeria's counterinsurgency framework to include OPSC, a home-grown prison-based deradicalization program for low-risk repentant or captured Boko Haram combatants certified eligible to undergo deradicalization. The study seeks to examine the social and economic impact of operation safe corridor on the livelihoods of rehabilitated insurgents in Borno State

Conceptualization and Review of Literature

Concept of Operation Safe Corridor: The Operation Safe Corridor was established by the Nigerian Government in 2016 to receive voluntary defectors from factions of the jihadist group Boko Haram. As part of a national strategy to degrade militant activity in the country's North East Region, the program faces problems. Critics claim that the authority's channel far too many civilians fleeing Boko Haram areas into Safe Corridor, unjustly mislabeling those jihadists, clogging the system, and putting off donors. More troubling are accounts from program participants who have seen sometimes deadly conditions at the facilities they pass through on the way into Safe Corridor – both a concern in its own right and a deterrent for those who might follow their path. Despite improvements, the reintegration of defectors into society can be bumpy. The program is also controversial, with critics arguing that it amounts to amnesty for terrorists. For Safe Corridor to thrive, the government will need to better screen out civilians, protect participants, and more effectively reintegrate graduates into society. It should also work harder to persuade the public of the program's merits.

The Nigerian Government created Safe Corridor in 2016 after concluding that it would not be able to completely defeat the Boko Haram insurgency, which it has been battling since 2009, by military means alone. The program's core target group is low-level jihadist recruits who perform combatant and/or non-combatant roles and are important to the daily functioning of Boko Haram's two main factions Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad, or JAS) and Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP). There is ample reason for these recruits to seek an exit. When defectors leave the jihadist factions, it is normally due to mounting skepticism of the insurgency's prospects, exposure to atrocious violence, the danger posed to them and their families, aversion to the factions' unfair and brutal internal politics, the lack of material gain after years of service and, for some, the desire to escape a movement they were coerced into joining.

Insurgency: According to the CIA, an insurgency is a 'protracted political and military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of the country using irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activity includes guerrilla warfare, terrorist-style attacks, and political mobilization, for example, propaganda, recruitment, covert operations and international activity designed to weaken government control and legitimacy. The common denominator of insurgents is their desire to control an area. This objective differentiates insurgents from purely terrorist organizations, whose goals do not include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given area or country (CIA, 2012). From the preceding, insurgency can widely be viewed from different schools of thought. Just like in the case of terrorism, with its various meanings and

interpretations, the concept of insurgency also varies in its use, but a cursory look can help give a better understanding of the meaning of insurgency.

Non-kinetic Approach: Almost every conflict has a combination of both kinetic and non-kinetic operations, ranging from full-scale invasions, to helping a country rebuild its schools and homes. Non-kinetic operations can be defined as the employment of nonlethal strategies and tactics with weapons that are "sublethal" or "weapons not intended to be lethal". (Casey-Maslen, 2018) LTC Cheng Hang references North Korea's nuclear test firing as an example. He says that although it "involved physical destruction, its intended effects on the enemies were a show of strength and deterrence". (Teo. 2017) He analyzes the intent behind the action and the method with which it was carried out, to determine whether it could be categorized as non-kinetic. Therefore, non-kinetic warfare is dependent upon the intent of the physical action. Likewise, how the public views intent directly relates to the outcome of the conflict. This adds another key part to non-kinetic warfare, the population. The population is vital to the success of the mission because they are the long-term sustainers of stability (William, 2009).

Boko Haram: Boko Haram is officially known by its founders as Jama'atuAhlis Sunna Lidda'awatiWal-Jihad, translated as "people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teaching and Jihad". It is a religious sect with footholds in mostly the Northeastern Region of Nigeria, but which has since become violent, and spilled-over to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (Council of Foreign Relations, cited in Vybiralova, 2016). The origin of Boko Haram is traceable to three different beginnings but related to the Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri in 2002. In that year, an offshoot of this youth group, before it was known as Boko Haram, deemed the city and the Islamic establishment to be grossly corrupt beyond salvation. Thus, to extricate itself from this corrupt brand of Islam, it declared hijra, in conformity with the Prophet Muhammad's withdrawal from Mecca to Medina, and relocated to the village of Kanama, in Yobe State, along the Nigeria-Niger border. There, the group formed a separatist community based on strict Islamic principles. Under its leadership, Mohammed Ali, the group promoted anti-state ideology and urged other Muslims to join its ranks and return to true Islam, which aimed to have a more perfect society devoid of corruption. The group had a community dispute in December 2003, over fishing rights in a local pond, which later resulted in conflict with the Police. The Police officers were overpowered, and their weapons were seized in the conflict.

Empirical Review: Academics have analyzed the activities of the Boko Haram insurgency since it emerged in northeastern Nigeria and the impact of Operation Safe Corridor's deradicalization program on repentant members. Also, less broadly studied is the extent to which the group's actions in the northeast have impacted the security of lives and property and particularly on the government deradicalization program from northern Nigeria. Thus, this study is significant in that it will bring to the limelight the negative impact of the Boko Haram insurgency, as it affects particularly the integration of people in northern Nigeria.

Foremost attempts to examine the correlation between religion and violence date back to David Rapoport's 1984 seminal study, *Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions.* Ever since, the interplay between radical religious doctrine and violence continues to attract the interest of social scientists that seem to agree that no major religion (Islam, Christianity, and Hinduism) promotes violence, at least not outrightly (Cinoglu, 2010). In an article published by Egypt Today, the editors listed ten authentic Hadiths (teachings of the prophet, peace be upon him) and Quranic verses that forbid

Muslims from murdering non-Muslims, except in times of war or self-defense (Egypt Today, 2017). Regrettably, religion has served as a justification for some of the most brutal wars in human history. The indiscriminate killings carried out by jihadists and crusaders are salutary reminders of this somber fact (Agbiboa et al, 2013). Nonetheless, arms-carrying non-state actors like Boko Haram insurgents justify their violent pursuit of an Islamic Caliphate with binding religious obligations. In what follows, an analysis of frameworks that examine the relationship between religion and violence is attempted.

Eme and Ibietan (cited in Owojobi, 2014) in their analysis of the origin and ideology of the sect, argued that Boko Haram otherwise known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awatiWal-Jihad was an Islamic terrorist group with a strong operational base in northeastern Nigeria. Eme and Ibietan (cited in Owojobi, 2014) surmised that the ideology of Boko Haram was to dismantle the secular structure of government in Nigeria and replace it with an Islamic system that was founded on Sharia Law. However, Lister (cited in Owojobi, 2014) held a contrary view to Eme and Ibietan that Boko Haram sought to Islamize Nigeria by introducing Sharia Law. Instead, he opined that Northern politician, who were bent on fomenting disunity in the country based on their selfish goals, had employed the services of disgruntled youths who were foot soldiers of the sect and paid them to perpetrate callous crimes in Nigeria. Aro (2013) observed that Boko Haram had in the cause of their campaign of terror, perpetrated heinous atrocities in Nigeria more than the other insurgent or militant groups that had emerged in the country. Oladesu (cited in Aro, 2013) shared a similar view when he stated that since after the horror of the civil war, none again had been seen as the one unleashed by the dreadful Boko Haram sect; in which many lives and properties totaling millions of naira had been destroyed. Also, a report indicated that the insurgency has displaced about three million to five million people, as well as truncated trade networks around Maiduguri, Kano, and Mubi, in addition to preventing several communities from farming (Quartz Africa, 2015).

Within structuralism's tradition, religion is viewed as a social institution guided by outlined tasks and obligations, which are central to the survival of societies. Structuralists tend not to question the basis and rationale of religion. They, however, emphasize carrying out the obligations that accompany religion (Durkheim, 1983). Religious terrorists influence the belief and worldviews of their devotees by admonishing them to eradicate immorality and infidels through militant means as a test of their faith or divine ordinance. Ideally, they are made to believe it is their responsibility to abolish corrupt secular states by any means necessary, as a requisite for preserving their religion (Juergensmeyer, 2010; Ishrat et al, 2014). For instance, Boko Haram devotees are indoctrinated into believing it is their responsibility to protect their interpretation of Islam, even if it means detonating explosives that kill them and others. For them, the world is a vicious cycle of perpetual suffering, and eternal peace and enjoinment cannot be attained by strictly adhering to religious obligations.

Proponents of the conflict theory of religion emphasize the importance of influential actors in determining the outlook and agenda of groups. They argue that the elites construct religion as an instrument to keep laborers under continual supervision and domination. As recompense for the sorrows of worldly life, religion offers the promise of reward and salvation in the afterlife (Cinoglu, 2010). For Marx (1844), religion offers illusive gratitude, which deflects workers 'consciousness from the realities of exploitation, in exchange for an unverifiable promise of happiness in life. In the context of Boko Haram, devotees are radicalized to view Jihad (Holy War) in terms of picking up arms against anyone who does not believe in their view of

religion, including other Islamic faithfuls like the Sunnis, who are comparatively more accommodating. In one of Shekau 's video messages, to the cheers of his followers and sporadic gunfire, the Boko Haram leader admonished true 'Muslims to join their struggle, or else they will be slaughtered. In an interview with BBC Hausa in 2009, late Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf stated that Western (formal) education accommodates practices and norms that contradict our belief in Islam '(BBC News 2009). In another interview, he went on to claim that before colonialism, present-day Northeast Nigeria was an Islamic enclave before colonialists brought their ways and turned it into a land of infidels. 'It is our duty to reclaim this land (Daily Trust 27 July 2009).

Modern Conflict Management Theory: Modern Conflict Management Theory is the most appropriate for a non-kinetic strategy to resolve violent conflict with particular reference to the case of 'Operation Safe Corridor integration and radicalization programs in Northeast Nigeria. The modern theory of conflict management incorporates past theories from Thomas, Blake and Mouton, Renwick, Rahim, and Hall models and theories and combined them to create a superior theory. After collecting research on the different theories, it was found that they all had the same underlying structure and could be grouped into the same category. Though five different theorists each individually proving they were correct, however, collaborating them to create the modern conflict management theory proves even more substantial for the above subject.

The modalities for integrating traditional and modern conflict management theories in Nigeria use an analysis of relevant documents as well as Black's Social Control Theory and Thomas-Kilmann's Model of Conflict Management. The successful amalgamation of diverse groups has radically shifted from being a platform for peaceful coexistence to an arena of violent conflicts due to the matrix of social inequality and the state's attempt to undermine the power of traditional social control systems. The police and military have been used to suspend several violent conflicts in Nigeria, but they have been unable to build peace despite their coercive power. The social structure and deep-seated grievances that generate violence have not been addressed and the crowding out of traditional methods of social control from official policies has left room for the escalation of violent conflicts. The most disturbing of these conflicts are ethnoreligious and resource-control conflicts, which have both resulted in the monumental destruction of peoples and properties and exposed different parts of Nigeria to the crisis. It is argued that a policy-driven synergy of useful traditional and modern strategies for conflict management will result in lasting peace in Nigeria.

Modern theory considers conflict as a natural and inevitable outcome of human interaction. Conflict situations often lead to the generation of new ideas and change. In particular, Conflict is defined as a disagreement between individuals. It can vary from a mild disagreement to a win-or-lose, emotion-packed, confrontation (Kirchhoff and Adams, 1982). Contemporary theory recognizes that conflicts between human beings are unavoidable. They emerge as a natural result of change and can be beneficial to the organization if managed efficiently. Current theory (Kirchhoff and Adams, 1982) considers innovation as a mechanism for bringing together various ideas and viewpoints into a new and different fusion. An atmosphere of tension, and hence conflict, is thus essential in any organization committed to developing or working with new ideas. A manager should be able to see emerging conflicts and take appropriate pre-emptive action. The manager should understand the causes creating conflict, the outcome of the conflict, and various methods by which conflict can be managed in the organization. With this understanding, the manager

should evolve an approach for resolving conflicts before their disruptive repercussions have an impact on productivity and creativity. Therefore, a manager should possess special skills to react to conflict situations and should create an open climate for communication between conflicting parties.

In my own view, to avoid the conceptual limitation inherent in the use of the term 'hybrid', I would suggest the concept 'integrate' to replace 'hybrid'. By doing so we will be borrowing from Gunther Schlee. Schlee and Watson (2009) applied an 'integrative approach' in the study of identities and conflicts in North-east Africa and found that the approach worked significantly. Thus, we will be able to replace 'hybrid' peacebuilding with an 'integrative approach' in peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes in North East Nigeria. Literally, 'integrate' implies mixing up things, or joining a society or group of people in a way that often allows members of those groups to change a bit and fit in the ways of life, habits, and customs of the other. Similarly, 'integrate' implies combining two or more things in order to become more effective. The synergy suggested by some scholars is all about making peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes more effective to the extent that we can create sustainable peace in conflict zones. It is all about changing ourselves to the extent that we establish mutual relations between the two approaches in the process of peacebuilding and conflict management. Rather than creating a new thing as suggested in the concept of hybrid, integration is all about effective collaboration to maximize efficiency and have better outcomes.

Methodology

The study adopts a survey research design. Survey research designs are procedures in quantitative research in which investigators administer a survey to a sample or to the entire population of people to describe the attitudes, opinions, behaviors, or characteristics of the population. In this procedure, survey researchers collect quantitative, numbered data using questionnaires and statistically analyze the data to describe trends about responses to questions and to test research questions or hypotheses. The study sampled opinion covered population of ex.boko haram member, operation save corridor, NGO/CSO, community's leader and security agencies in Borno States, North East Nigeria. A total of 374 sample respondents were determined using Taro Yamane (1967) sample size formula for the study. A combination of simple random, purposive was deployed in the selection of respondents for the study. While simple random sampling technique was used in the selection of respondents for questionnaire in the communities chosen from the purposively selected LGAs, Data were collected using structured questionnaire and in-depth interview. Data were subjected to descriptive and inferential statistical analysis using SPSS. Descriptive statistics provided summaries such as frequencies, percentages, and cross-tabulations to highlight patterns in respondents' demographic characteristics and perceptions. Additionally, logistic regression was employed to examine the relationship between socio-demographic variables (e.g., gender, age, education, employment status, marital status, and ethnicity) and the perceived effectiveness of the Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC) program. The chi-square test was used to determine whether significant associations existed between categorical variables, such as gender, educational attainment, or marital status, and the perceived outcomes of the deradicalization and reintegration processes. These methods used ensured that the data was analyzed comprehensively, capturing both descriptive and inferential insights necessary for evaluating the OPSC program's effectiveness in deradicalization and reintegration efforts.

Data Analysis and Result

The analysis of the 374 respondents shows a varied demographic profile that significantly impacts the assessment of the Operation Safe Corridor program. The sample includes a notable gender disparity, with 68.4% male and 31.6% female respondents. This imbalance reflects broader societal trends, where men are often more directly impacted by conflict and radicalization. Literature on gender and conflict suggests that men may experience and perceive radicalization differently than women, which could influence their views on the program's effectiveness (Lederach, 1997). In terms of age, the majority of respondents fall within the 26 to 35-year-old range, with a mean age of 35.78 years.

This age group is particularly relevant as it represents individuals who are often at significant points in their personal and professional lives. Research indicates that individuals in this age bracket are likely to have a more nuanced understanding of deradicalization efforts (Bakker & de Graaf, 2011). Educational attainment also varies, with many respondents having secondary or tertiary education, a factor associated with greater engagement in and awareness of social programs (Hsieh & Pugh, 1993). Employment status further diversifies the sample, with a mix of employed, self-employed, and unemployed respondents. This diversity is important as employment status can influence perceptions of the program's success. Employed individuals may have different expectations and experiences compared to the unemployed (Klein & Clarke, 2009). Marital status also plays a role, with respondents being predominantly married. Literature on family dynamics suggests that marital status can affect how individuals perceive and evaluate social programs (Carlson & McLanahan, 2006). Religious affiliation and ethnicity reflect the region's diversity, with a majority of respondents being Muslim and the largest ethnic group being Kanuri.

This diversity highlights the importance of considering cultural and religious factors in assessing program effectiveness, as these elements can significantly shape perceptions of reconciliation and reintegration programs (Miall, 2004). Finally, the length of residence in Borno State is noteworthy, with most respondents having lived there for over a decade. Long-term residents might offer more informed perspectives on the program's impact, given their extended experience with both the insurgency and the program's interventions (Adeleke & Bakare, 2016).

Table 1.1b: The Social and Economic Impact of Operation Safe Corridor

Variables	Frequency (n = 374)	Percentage (%)
The Operation Safe Corridor program has improved the economic conditions of rehabilitated insurgents.		
Strongly agreed	138	36.9
Agreed	111	29.7
Neutral	79	21.1
Disagreed	29	7.8
Strongly disagreed	17	4.5
Former insurgents who have completed the program have been able to secure employment or livelihood opportunities.		
Strongly agreed	127	34.0
Agreed	115	30.7
Neutral	84	22.5
Disagreed	28	7.5
Strongly disagreed	20	5.3
The program has helped in reducing economic dependency among rehabilitated insurgents		
Strongly agreed	133	35.6
Agreed	103	27.5
Neutral	82	21.9
Disagreed	34	9.1
Strongly disagreed	22	5.9
Social interactions between rehabilitated insurgents and community members have improved since their reintegration		
Strongly agreed	129	34.5
Agreed	125	33.4
Neutral	73	19.5
Disagreed	28	7.5
Strongly disagreed	19	5.1

Table 1.2: The Social and Economic Impact of Operation Safe Corridor (Cont.…)

Variables	Frequency (n = 374)	Percentage (%)
The vocational training provided by Operation Safe Corridor has been effective in enhancing the livelihoods of former insurgents		
Strongly agreed	148	39.6
Agreed	116	31.0
Neutral	73	19.5
Disagreed	21	5.6
Strongly disagreed	16	4.3

Table 1.1b presents respondents' views on the social and economic impact of the Operation Safe Corridor program, which focuses on rehabilitating insurgents. In terms of economic improvement, 36.9% of respondents strongly agreed that the program has improved the economic conditions of rehabilitated insurgents, with 29.7% agreeing. A total of 21.1% were neutral, while 7.8% disagreed and 4.5% strongly disagreed. Regarding the ability of former insurgents to secure employment or livelihood opportunities, 34.0% strongly agreed, 30.7% agreed, 22.5% were neutral, 7.5% disagreed, and 5.3% strongly disagreed. The program's role in reducing economic dependency among rehabilitated insurgents was affirmed by 35.6% of respondents who strongly agreed, and 27.5% who agreed. However, 21.9% remained neutral, while 9.1% disagreed, and 5.9% strongly disagreed. Social interactions between rehabilitated insurgents and community members were also perceived positively, with 34.5% strongly agreeing and 33.4% agreeing that these interactions had improved since reintegration. A smaller portion (19.5%) were neutral, while 7.5% disagreed and 5.1% strongly disagreed.

Table 1.2 highlights respondents' views on the effectiveness of the vocational training provided by the Operation Safe Corridor program in enhancing the livelihoods of former insurgents. A significant portion of respondents, 39.6%, strongly agreed that the vocational training has been effective, while 31.0% agreed. A total of 19.5% remained neutral, indicating uncertainty or mixed feelings. Meanwhile, 5.6% disagreed and 4.3% strongly disagreed with the effectiveness of the training.

Table 1.3: Overall Level of Social and Economic Impact of Operation Safe Corridor.

Variables	Frequency (n = 374)	Percentage (%)
Positive Impact (≥ mean)	184	49.2
Negative Impact (< mean)	190	50.8
Total	374	100

Table 1.3 summarizes respondents' overall assessment of the social and economic impact of the Operation Safe Corridor program. The results indicate a nearly even split in perceptions, with 49.2% of respondents reporting a positive impact and 50.8% reporting a negative impact. The mean score for the impact was 19.3, with a standard deviation of ±2.619, suggesting some variation in responses. These findings indicate that while nearly half of the respondents view the program's social and economic influence positively, a slightly larger portion remains unconvinced, highlighting differing opinions on the program's overall effectiveness.

Discussion of Findings

Social and Economic Impact

The economic impact of the program is viewed positively by some respondents, with 36.9% strongly agreeing and 29.7% agreeing that it has improved economic conditions. However, the overall assessment is divided, with 49.2% viewing the program positively and 50.8% negatively. This reflects the complexities of measuring the economic impact of deradicalization programs, where outcomes can be influenced by numerous factors (Miller & Smith, 2012). The perceived effectiveness of vocational training is a positive indicator, but there is still significant room for improvement in addressing the broader economic and social impacts.

The logistic regression analysis indicates that gender, age, and education are significant predictors of the program's effectiveness. Males, individuals aged 26-35 years, and those with higher education levels are more likely to view the program as effective. These findings align with existing literature on the influence of these factors on perceptions of intervention programs (Jones & Smith, 2021; Taylor

& Anderson, 2019). Self-employed individuals and married respondents are more likely to find the program effective. This supports research suggesting that stable employment and marital status can positively influence perceptions of social programs (Brown & Hargrove, 2018; Williams & Brown, 2017). Newer residents and the Fulani ethnic group are more likely to view the program positively. This aligns with literature suggesting that recent experiences and ethnic background can influence perceptions of intervention effectiveness (Kandeh, 2018; Phillips, 2019). Funding challenges, political interference, security concerns, lack of collaboration, and cultural barriers did not significantly impact the program's effectiveness. This suggests that while these factors are relevant, their impact may be less direct or less significant than other socio-demographic variables (Smith & Huo, 2018; Rogers & Williams, 2019).

Conclusion and Recommendation

This study offers valuable insights into the Operation Safe Corridor program in Borno State, Nigeria, by examining its effectiveness, reintegration outcomes, and socio-economic impacts.

The findings reveal that the program's effectiveness is perceived differently based on several socio-demographic factors. Notably, males tend to view the program more positively than females, which may reflect differing levels of engagement or expectations based on gender. Younger participants and those with higher educational backgrounds also report higher effectiveness, suggesting that these groups may better understand and appreciate the program's benefits. Additionally, self-employed individuals and married respondents have more favorable views on the program's effectiveness, possibly due to the stability and support these statuses provide,

Based on the study's findings, the following recommendations are proposed:

i. **Focus on Youth Engagement:** The younger demographic, particularly those aged 18-25, shows a lower likelihood of finding the program effective. To better engage this group, the program should consider incorporating elements that appeal to younger individuals. This might include leveraging digital platforms, interactive content, or peer-led sessions. Tailoring these elements to match the interests and communication preferences of young adults can enhance their positive perception of the program.

ii. **Enhance Educational Support:** Individuals with no formal education are notably less likely to view the program as effective. To address this issue, the program should implement educational support initiatives, such as basic literacy and numeracy workshops. Additionally, providing tailored educational materials about the program can help improve understanding and perceptions among those with lower educational attainment.

iii. **Support Self-Employed Individuals:** The analysis indicates that self-employed individuals are more likely to perceive the program positively. To build on this favorable outlook, the program could offer additional support and resources for self-employed participants. This might include business development workshops, financial assistance, or networking opportunities, which can further enhance their engagement and positive perceptions.

iv. **Support New Residents:** Those who have lived in Borno State for less than five years are more likely to view the program

positively. To capitalize on this positive perception, the program should focus on providing additional support and orientation for new residents. This could include community integration activities that help newcomers understand and engage with the program more effectively.

v. **Engage Ethnic Communities:** Fulani respondents show a higher likelihood of perceiving the program positively. To leverage this positive perception, the program should involve ethnic leaders and community representatives in its delivery and promotion. Engaging with these leaders can build trust and credibility, fostering broader acceptance and support across different ethnic groups.

References

Abeokuta. Curtas, S. D., (2006). A New Type of Insurgency? A Case Study of the Resistance in Iraq. Graduate Thesis and Dissertation. Scholar Commons, University of South Florida.

Abimbola, A. The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria,‖ Africa Spectrum, February 2010, 95. Available at: www.africaspectrum.com/boko-haram-uprising

Abolurin, A., (2012). An Assessment of Roles of Security Agencies in Checkmating Insurgent Movements in Nigeria. African Journal for the Psychological study of Social Issues, 15 (1 &2): 250-270.

Adaobi, T. N. (2020). Remembering Nigeria Biafra War that Many Prefer to Forget, BBC News, (January 15, 2020). Available at; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51094093

Adedoyin, A. (2013). Human Security Factor in Agricultural Transformation in Nigeria. In Isaac Olawale Albert et al (Eds.) TheSecurity Sector and Conflict Management in Nigeria. Peace and Conflict Studies programme, University of Ibadan, Ibadan.

Adegbami, A. (2015). "An Assessment of the Implementation of the Federal Character Principle in the Federal Civil Service of Nigeria." An Unpublished Ph.D. Degree Dissertation, Submitted to the Department of Public Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife.

Adeniyi, A. (2017). Breaking: Man killed as Nigerian Army mistakenly drop bomb on IDP Camps Naija News . January 17. Retrieved January 7, 2021, from https:// www.naijanews.com/2017/01/17/breaking-manykilled-nigerian-army-mistakenly-drop bomb-idpcamp/

Adeleke, A., & Bakare, A. (2016). *Long-term impact of conflict on communities in Nigeria*. Nigerian Journal of Conflict Resolution, 5(2), 123-145.

Adewumi A. (2014). The Battle of the Minds: the Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in Northern Nigeria. West Africa insight, May 2014 Boko Haram

Afeikhena, J. (2015). Lessons from Colombia from containing the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria. PRISM, Vol.5. No. 2.

Agbiboa D. E. (2013b) _No Retreat, No Surrender: Understanding the Religious Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria'. *African Study Monographs*, 34(2): 65–84.

Agbiboa, D. E and Maiangwa, B. (2013). Nigeria: Towards a Non-killing Approach Boko Haram, Religious Violence, and the Crisis of National Identity in Nigeria: Towards a Non-Killing Approach. Journal of Developing Societies. Vol. 29. Pp. 379.

Agbiboa, D. E. (2013). The Nigerian Burden: Religious Identity, Conflict and the Current Terrorism of Boko Haram. *Conflict, Security*

and Development, 13(1): 1–29. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080

Agbiboa, D. E. (2013a). The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria: Boko Haram versus the State. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, Vol. 2. No. 3, Pp. 1-18.

Agebse Dan. (2020). NDDC: Shame on Niger Deltans. The Guardian, July 30, 2020. Available at: https://guardian.ng/opinion/columnists/ nddc-shame-on-niger-deltans/

Ahmed, S. (2019). Religion and perceptions of social programs: A review of recent literature. *Journal of Social Policy Studies*, 35(4), 489-504.

Akubo, J. (2020). Opposition voices knock Gaidam over bill on Boko Haram, The Guardian, March 03, 2020. Available at; https://guardian.ng/politics/opposition-voices-knock gaidam-overbill-on-boko-haram

Akum, F., Hoinathy, R., & Samuel, M. (2021). Managing the Journey out of Violent Extremism in the Lake Chad Basin. Institute for Security Studies, West African Report, 30. Retrieved June 3, 2021, from https://issa frica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war-32-1.pdf

Awortu, B. E., (2015). Boko Haram Insurgency and Underdevelopment of Nigeria. Research on Humanities and Social Sciences (5) 6 pg 213-220.

Bappah, H. Y. (2016). Nigeria's military failure against Boko Haram insurgency. African Security Review, 25(2), 1–13.

Berman, E., & Kohn, M. (2013). *Economic aspects of deradicalization programs*. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57(4), 678-693.

BBC News (2009). Nigeria's Taliban enigma. 31 July. Available at: www.bbc.com/news/world Africa-654737748

Belloni, R. (2012). Hybrid peace governance: Its emergence and significance. Global Governance, 18(1), 21–38. https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-01801004

Bakker, E., & de Graaf, B. (2011). *The radicalization of extremists*. Journal of Terrorism Research, 3(1), 45-60.

Bercovitch, J. (1983). "Conflict and Conflict Management in Organizations: A Framework for Analysis." Hong Kong Journal of Public Administration, 5(2), 104-123.

Brown, K., Smith, J., & Williams, R. (2020). Gender and program evaluation: Insights from recent studies. *International Journal of Program Evaluation*, 28(3), 245-260.

Bukarti, A. B., & Bryson, R. (2019). Dealing with Boko Haram defectors in the Lake Chad Basin_ lessions from Nigeria. Tony Blair Institute of Global Change. Retrieved Nov 20, 2019, from https://institute.global/ insight/coexistence/dealing-boko-haram defectorslakechad-basin-lessons-

Nigeria Centre for Democracy and Development. (n.d.). Stakeholders' dialogue on Government approaches to managing defecting violent extremism.

Bushman, B. J., & Huesmann, L. R. (2010). "Aggression." In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology (5th Ed.), 833– 863. New York: Wiley. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470561119.s ocpsy002023.

Carlson, M., & McLanahan, S. (2006). *Family structure and children's well-being*. American Sociological Review, 71(4), 469-488.

Campbell, J. (2014c). U.S Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram, Centre for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report, November, 17. Available at; https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/20 14/11/Nigeria_CSR70.pdf

Carter, L., & Shaw, M. (2020). Employment status and perceptions of social program impacts.

Journal of Employment and Social Policy, 32(1), 76-90.

Chatham House. (2020). The Development of Libyan Armed Group Since 2014: Community Dynamics and Economy Interest., Research Paper. Available at; https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/03/development-libyan-armed-groups-2014

Chaturvedi, A. K. (2006). Dictionary of Political Science. New Delhi: Academic (India) Publishers.

Chidera, I. (2008). "N' delta Committee Submits Report, says Nigeria lost $20.7bn to Crisis. The Punch Newspaper, 2 December 2008.

Clark, R., & Stewart, L. (2021). The impact of residential duration on program perceptions: Evidence from conflict-affected regions. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, 39(2), 155-172.

Choonenboom, J., & Johnson, B. R. (2017). How to contract a mixed methods research design. Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 69(2), 107–131. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-017-0454- 1

Chris E. (2016). The Niger Delta Avengers: Nigeria's newest militants. BBC News, June 1. Available at; https://www.bbc.com/news/world -africa-36414036

Daily Trust Editorial (2009). Nigeria: Boko Haram sect leader Ustaz Mohammed vows revenge. July, 27. Available from: http://www.nairaland.com/302352/islamists-yar-adua-want totla/6

Daniel. F. (2017). Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems. Hampshire:

Danjibo, N., (2013). The Imperative of National and Human Security as Panacea for Peace and Development: A Theoretical Discourse. In Isaac Olawale Albert et al (Eds.) the Security Sector and Conflict Management in Nigeria. Peace and Conflict Studies programme, University of Ibadan, Ibadan 2013.

Dennen, J. M. G. V. D. (2005). "Problems in the Concepts and Definitions of Aggression, Violence, and Some Related Terms: Pt 2. Default Journal." https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Problems-in-the-Concepts-andDefinitions-of

Dennen, J. M. G. V. D. (2005). "Problems in the Concepts and Definitions of Aggression, Violence, and Some Related Terms: Pt 2. Default Journal." https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Problems-in-the-Concepts-andDefinitions-of and-PtDennen/8181aa6755e3ed97b7f322920893c3f728a99de4

Development Commission-Bill.pdf Obi, A. (2021). Quit while you are ahead: Why Boko Haram fighters are surrendering, The New Humanitarian, August 12. Retrieved May 30th, 2021, from https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2021/8/12/why-boko-haram-fighters-surrendering

Diez, T., Stetter, S. & Albert, M. (2006). "The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration." International Organization, 60(3), 563-593. And PtDennen/8181aa6755e3ed97b7f322920893c3f728a99de4.

Dinnen, S., & Kent, L. (2015). Hybridity in peacebuilding and development: A critical interrogation. In Brief (2015/50). Retrieved from Australian National University website: http:// dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/4118/hybridity peacebuilding-anddevelopment-critical

Drew, H. (2012). Nigeria's Former Oil Bandits Now Collect Government Cash,‖ Wall Street Journal, (August 22, 2012). Available at; https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304019404577420160886588518

Dudouet, V. (2010). Mediating peace with proscribe Armed Groups. USIP Special Report, no. 239. United States Institute of Peace.

Durkheim, E. (1933). The Division of Labor in Society. (Translated by George Simpson). New York: The Free Press.

Faisal, K and Kemakolam, I. (2019). Nigeria: Community's Perception of Legitimate Authority Matters for Rehabilitation and Reintegration. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. Available at; http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep19803

Fakuade, G. (2020). Ethnicity and laguage. In A. A. Adebayo, A. L. Tukur, & A. A. Zemba (Eds.), Adamawa state in maps (Second ed., pp. 142–145). Paraclete Publishers.

Felbab-Brown, V, (2018). In Nigeria, we don't want them back. Brookings Institute, May 2018. Available at; https://www.brookings.edu/research/in-nigeria-we-dont-want-them-back/

Felbab-Brown, V. (2018). "In Nigeria, we don't want them back": Amnesty, defectors' programmes, leniency measures, informal reconciliation, and punitive response to Boko Haram. United Nations University.

Fisher, J. (2018). Gender differences in program evaluations: A comprehensive review. *Gender and Development Journal*, 16(1), 50-65.

Fischer, H. Gießmann, & B. Schmelzle (Eds.), Berghof handbook for conflict transformation (pp. 1-21). Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Fox News. (2013). Nigerian President Declares State of Emergency. May 14. Available at: www.foxnews.com/world/2013/05/14/stateemergency-declared-in-nigeria

Fox News. (2013). Nigerian President Declares State of Emergency. May 14. Available at: www.foxnews.com/world/2013/05/14/state-emergency-declared-in-nigeria

Galtung, J. (2009). Theories of Conflict: Definitions, Dimensions, Negations, Formations. New York: Colombia University Press

Gilbert. L. (2014). Prolongation of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: the International Dimensions. Research on Humanities and Social Science. 4, (11): 150-156

Gilbert. L. (2014). Prolongation of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: the International

Horgan, J. (2009). *Deradicalization programs: An overview*. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(4), 290-307.

Horgan, J., & Braddock, K. (2010). *Assessing the impact of deradicalization programs*. Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, 22(2), 261-279.

Ibanga, I. (2014). Boko Haram Wants War between Christians, Muslims in Nigeria—Jonathan. Premium Times, May 5, 2014, accessed June 7. Available at; http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/16013 5-boko-haram-wants-war-between christians-muslims-in-nigeriajonathan.html.

Ibiang, O. E. (2018). Nigeria's Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Implications, Issues, and Lessons for National Security, Review of History and Political Science, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 33-42.

Ibrahim, I. (2017). Why Nigerian Army bombed Rann IDP camp killing scores- defence headquarters. Premium Times, July 22. Retrieved May 24, 2021, from https:// www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/237729- why-nigerian-military-bombed rann-idp-camp-killing -scores-defence-headquarters.html

Ibrahim, J., Bagu, C., & Ya'u, Y. Z. (ed.) (2017). Understanding community resilience in the context of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Ikena, I. (2018). Boko Haram Wants War between Christians, Muslims in Nigeria—Jonathan.

Premium Times, May 5, 2014, accessed June 7. Available at; http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/160135-boko-haram-wants-war-between christians-muslims-in-nigeria-jonathan.html.

James, A. F. (2016). The Nature of Nigeria's Boko Haram War, 2010- 2015: A Strategic Analysis. Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 10. Issue, 1. Pp. 41-52.

Jones, A., Smith, R., & Williams, M. (2019). Age and the effectiveness of social interventions: A review of recent research. *Journal of Aging Studies*, 45(2), 89-104.

Joseph, O. A and Trust, M. (2019). Nigerian Experience with PostConflict Peacebuilding: Examining Operation Safe Corridors and the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme. Journal of African Union Studies, Vol. 8, No.3, Pp. 139-160,

Juergensmeyer, M. (2003). Terror in the mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Khalid, S. (2018). *Security challenges in implementing deradicalization programs in conflict zones*. International Security Review, 15(3), 23-34.

Klein, H., & Clarke, L. (2009). *Funding and political challenges in conflict resolution*. Peace and Conflict Studies, 16(1), 90-107.

Kleinmann, S. (2014). *The role of psychological counseling in deradicalization*. Journal of Terrorism Research, 6(1), 15-28.

Liolio, S., (2013). Rethinking Insurgency: A Case study of Boko Haram in Nigeria. A Thesis Submitted to the European Peace University, Austria. Moore,

M. Bracken, R. E. Rosenthal, J. Kress, Warfare Modeling (Military Operations Research Society, Alexandria, VA, 1995).

Mac Ginty, R. (2010). Hybrid peace: The interaction between top-down and bottom-up peace. Security Dialogue, 41(4), 391-412. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010610374312

Magoti, I. R. (2017). Ethnic identity and the state: The dynamics of intra- and inter- ethnic relations in the mara river basin, 1900-2010 (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from the University of Dares-Salaam website: https://www.udsm.ac.tz/

Mandel, D. (2012). *Recidivism in deradicalization programs*. Counterterrorism Review, 4(2), 55-72.

Miall, H. (2004). *Understanding the role of religion in conflict and peacebuilding*. Peace Research, 39(1), 15-32.

Miller, L., & Smith, R. (2012). *Economic reintegration of former insurgents*. Journal of Development Economics, 20(3), 99-112.

Miller, T., & Reed, A. (2018). The role of marital status in social program effectiveness: Evidence from recent studies. *Journal of Marriage and Family Research*, 29(4), 212-228.

Mohammed, K. (2014). The message and methods of Boko Haram. In M.-A. Pérouse de Montclos (Ed.), *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria* (Vol. 2, pp. 9–32). African Studies Centre. *West African Politics and Society Series*

Momodu, J. A., & Owonikoko, B. S. (2018) (Eds.). Activity report on preparatory reintegration seminar with strategic stakeholders in Adamawa state. Centre for Peace and Security Studies.

Morgan, M. (2004). The Origins of the New Terrorism. Parameters, Vol. 34, No. 1. pp. 30–31.

Musa, A., (2015). Boko Haram and Public Health: the Grave Consequences. (part 1). Abusidiqu.com/boko-haram-and-public-health-the grave-consequences-part-1- by abubakar-musa/.3

Nichols, M. (2013) Libyan Arms Fueling Conflict in Mali, Syria and Beyond: UN Expert, Reuters,

https://www.reuters.com/article/uslibya-arms-un-idUSBRE93814Y20130409

Nicholson, M. (1992). Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press

Obogu J, C, (2016). Nigeria's Approach to Terrorist Rehabilitation. Counter Terrorist Trends and

OCHA, (2014). www.internal-displacement.org/subshaharn-africa/nige ria/2014/Nigeria multiple-e-crises-overshadoed-by-boko-haram. Retrieved on October 3rd, 2015

Ogbogbo, E. U. (2020). Federal Government amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta: An Appraisal. *Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi Cilt*: 11, Sayı: 21, ss.179-203. Available at; file:///C:/Users/u/Downloads

Okeke, U and Onapajo, H. (2015). The Rage of Insurgency: Why Boko Haram may remain Untamed. African Renaissance, Vol. 12. No. 2. Pp. 49-70.

Olojo, A., (2013). Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram.

Http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-OlojoNigerias-Trobuled-North-October 2013.pdf. Pulse,ng., 2015. Pulse,n/students/boko-haram- vs-education-600-teachers killed-19000- displaced-in-borno-kano-kadnuaid4238340.html.

Onuoha, F. C. (2020). Dilemma of voluntary surrender to state security forces by Boko Haram recruits in Nigeria. African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research, 1(1), 199–218. https://doi.org/10.31920/ 2732-5008/2020/S1n1a11

Onuoha, F. C., Nwangwu, C., & Ugwueze, M. I. (2020). Counterinsurgency operations of the Nigerian Military and Boko Haram insurgency: Expounding the viscid manacle. Security Journal, 33(3), 401–426. https:// doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00234-6

S. Tzu, The Art of War (Tuttle Publishing, North Clarendon, VT, 1996).

Schmid, A. (2013). *Cultural factors in the reintegration of former combatants*. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 30(4), 340-356.

Singer, K. (1949). "The Meaning of Conflict." Australian Journal of Philosophy, 27 (3), 141 157.

Smith, J., & Johnson, H. (2020). Socio-demographic factors and their impact on program evaluations: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Social Sciences*, 38(3), 305-320.

Stuart Casey-Maslen. (2018). Non-kinetic-energy weapons termed 'nonlethal'.

Technology and Development. Ike, J. T., Danny, S., Dunk, J. E., Sean, M., & Evangelyn, A. E. (2021). Rethinking reintegration in Nigeria: Community perceptions of former Boko Haram combatants. Third World Quarterly, 42(4), 661–678. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1872376

Teo Cheng Hang. Non-kinetic warfare: The reality and the response.

The Cable. (2020). Boko Haram kills humanitarian workers abducted in Borno State. Retrieved June 23rd, 2021, from https://www.thecable.ng/boko-haram-killshumanitarian-workers abducted-in-borno

The Economic Times (December 24, 2020), Niger Delta Avengers, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/Niger-Delta-Avengers

The Guardian, 16th September (2015). www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/09/chol era-kills-16-at boko-haram-displaced- camps-in-ne-nigeria-msf/. Retrieved on the 14th of October, 2015UNDP Human Development Report., 1999. Hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1994_en_ch ap5.pdf

Ukago, C., (2017). Fear of Food Insecurity Grips Nigeria," Saturday This day, November 8, P.24.3

Williams, E. U. (2015). Insecurity in Nigeria: Political, Religious and Cultural Implications. Journal of Philosophy Culture and Religion, Vol. 5. Pp. 1-8.

World Health Organization. (2019). "Violence, Injuries, and Disability." Retrieved January 16, 2020, from http://www.emro.who.int/violence-injuriesdisabilities/violence/.

